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“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred 
battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also 
suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every 
battle.”  
― Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
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Abstract 
 
 
 This thesis presents a decision aiding system named C3-SEC (Contex-aware Corporative 
Cyber Security), developed in the context of a master program at Polytechnic Institute of 
Leiria, Portugal. The research dimension and the corresponding software development 
process that followed are presented and validated with an application scenario and case study 
performed at Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas ESPE – Ecuador. 
C3-SEC is a decision aiding software intended to support cyber risks and cyber threats 
analysis of a corporative information and communications technological infrastructure. The 
resulting software product will help corporations Chief Information Security Officers 
(CISO) on cyber security risk analysis, decision-making and prevention measures for the 
infrastructure and information assets protection. 
The work is initially focused on the evaluation of the most popular and relevant tools 
available for risk assessment and decision making in the cyber security domain. Their 
properties, metrics and strategies are studied and their support for cyber security risk 
analysis, decision-making and prevention is assessed for the protection of organization's 
information assets.  
A contribution for cyber security experts decision support is then proposed by the means of  
reuse and integration of existing tools and C3-SEC software. C3-SEC extends existing tools 
features from the data collection and data analysis (perception) level to a full context-ware 
reference model. 
The software developed makes use of semantic level, ontology-based knowledge 
representation and inference supported by widely adopted standards, as well as cyber 
security standards (CVE, CPE, CVSS, etc.) and cyber security information data sources 
made available by international authorities, to share and exchange information in this 
domain. C3-SEC development follows a context-aware systems reference model addressing 
the perception, comprehension, projection and decision/action layers to create corporative 
scale cyber security situation awareness. 
 
Keywords: Decision making; cybersecurity; risk analysis. 
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Introduction 
 
Surely one of the greatest risks to an organization's information security is not often the 
weakness in the technology control environment. Rather it is the action or non-action by all 
the people that are using the technology. Recent reports have revealed the emergence of 
millions of computer security incidents per year and each year new records are reached. They 
refer that in 2014, 65% of companies, victim of intrusion and information theft, were notified 
after a late detection process that lasts 13 months on average [1]. 
1.1 Motivation 
Current cyber security reports like the one mentioned in the previous section, motivates the 
development of new technologies that can augment human understanding and decision-
making abilities to create situation awareness in cyber environments. Situation awareness in 
cyber environments is made possible by the process of deriving context knowledge 
(awareness) from a multitude of information sources. Generally, it comprises three main 
levels, perception, comprehension and projection, which feeds the decision and action cycle. 
Perception, involves sensory of significant information about the system itself and the 
environment it is operating in. This information can be obtained with the help of data 
collection tools related to the technological infrastructure of an organization (hardware, 
services, databases). Comprehension, encompasses more than simply sensing/perceiving 
data, it relates the meaning of the information with the system goal/purpose. It can be 
represented through an ontology for context knowledge representation. Projection, consists 
of predicting how system current state will evolve (in time) and how it will affect the future 
states of the operating environment.  
 
Currently there are tools that comprise the different levels of situation awareness to help 
detect, prevent and recover from cyber incidents that could threaten the security of an 
organization. Nevertheless, many existing security tools and approaches focus on system 
and application levels. For this reason, security analysts need more up to date systematic 
methods to quantitatively evaluate network vulnerabilities, predict attack risk and potential 
  2 
impacts, assess proper actions to minimize business damages, and ensure mission success in 
a hostile environment. As a natural descendant of this requirement, security metrics are of 
major importance for context security awareness, coordinated network defense, and mission 
assurance analysis. They can provide a better understanding of the adequacy of security 
controls, and help security analysts to effectively identify which critical assets to focus their 
limited resources on to ensure mission success [2]. 
1.2 Objectives 
This work proposes a context-aware systems approach to identify, define, develop and apply 
a simple comprehensive security and business continuity assurance analysis. The research 
addresses existing security tools and metrics for the cyber security domain for systems and 
network operations analysis, along the context-aware system approach layers, perception, 
comprehension, projection and decision/action cycle. 
 
The (software) decision support system resulting from this study is named C3-SEC (Contex-
aware Corporative Cyber Security) and intends to provide cyber security decision makers 
the ability to make informed decisions, selecting the best course of action to mitigate 
identified vulnerabilities/threats and ensure business continuation in the actual hostile cyber 
environment. 
1.3 Organization 
The rest of the document is organized as follows, chapter 2 presents and compares the most 
relevant information and communication infrastructure data collection tools to support the 
perception level of the approach proposed in this thesis. This chapter also introduces the 
cyber security standards adopted by these tools. Chapter 3 elaborates on knowledge 
representation technologies and standards, such as ontology design and engineering using 
the Ontology Web Language (OWL) standard. Additionally, a software tool developed in 
this thesis to support the comprehension layer of the followed approach is presented. In 
chapter 4, the most relevant risk strategies and techniques adopted by cyber security risk 
analysis tools are studied and compared. Chapter 5 proposes an innovative customizable 
cyber security risk strategy to make the best use of corporations/business knowledge and 
expertise on information assets/value. A case study carried out at the Universidad de las 
  3 
Fuerzas Armadas ESPE – Ecuador is presented in chapter 6, showing the support provided 
by the approach and software tools developed in the context of this thesis along the full 
perception-action cycle. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the thesis contributions and points 
future research directions. 
A literature revision is presented along the chapters of the thesis, according to the research 
topics addressed in each chapter. 
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Perception Level 
 
Currently there are several tools that provide data collection features about an Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT) infrastructure. Some of them include vulnerability 
scanning to analyze the technological infrastructure of an organization, based on metrics and 
standards already established by international cyber security entities (MITRE, NIST). These 
tools can generate reports of threats found in the infrastructure and help security managers 
to identify risks that may affect business continuity. The output of these tools that operate at 
the perception layer, will be used as input for the comprehension level, more specifically to 
instantiate the semantic model designed at the ontology level. 
These tools are identified, described and compared in the following sections, after the most 
relevant cyber security standards adopted by them are introduced in section 2.1. 
2.1 Cyber security Standards and Metrics 
This section introduces the most relevant standards and metrics proposed by international 
standardizing organizations and adopted by cyber security tools, which are of utmost 
importance for cyber security information sharing and exchange. Cyber security information 
sharing and exchange (vulnerabilities identification, vulnerabilities severity classification, 
exploits, etc.) is seen in this thesis and by all international public/private authorities in the 
cyber security domain of crucial importance to fight cyber-attacks and protect legitimate 
public and private information systems and information assets. 
2.1.1 Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE) 
CCE [3] defines a list that provides unique identifiers to security-related system 
configuration to facilitate fast and accurate correlation of configuration statements presents 
in disparate domains. In addition, CCE is also one of six existing open standards used by the 
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) [4] in its Security Content 
Automation Protocol (SCAP) [5] program, which combines “a suite of tools to help automate 
vulnerability management and evaluate compliance with United States of America federal 
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information technology security requirements”. Numerous products have been validated by 
NIST as conforming to the CCE component of SCAP.   
2.1.2 Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) 
CPE [6] is a standardized method of describing and identifying classes of applications, 
operating systems, and hardware devices present among an enterprise's computing assets. 
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [7] defines a dictionary with every single CPE 
existent, and since they are listed in order to make the technological world more 
standardized, many IT systems use CPE to improve correlation of test results, and ease 
gathering of metrics. A CPE usually consists on the prefix “cpe:” and then other three parts 
that begin with a slash. The three parts identify hardware, OS and Application. 
 
NMAP [8] is one application that uses the CPE standard which allows to cross information 
with the NVD CVE file. The current version of CPE is 2.3 which is defined through a set of 
specifications in a stack-based model, where capabilities are based on simpler, more 
narrowly defined elements that are specified in lower levels of the stack. This design opens 
opportunities for innovation, as novel capabilities can be defined by combining only the 
needed elements, and the impacts of changes can be better compartmentalized and managed. 
2.1.3 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)  
CVE [9] is the industry standard for sharing/publishing vulnerabilities and exposure names. 
It was created in 1999, when almost every security tool used their specific database and their 
specific names. This was a problem since it was not possible to determine when different 
databases were referring the same product, the same vulnerabilities or even if a value for the 
vulnerability severity would mean the same in another database. This could result in security 
gaps coverage and in an ineffective integration of all the databases. CVE appeared to solve 
this problem, proposing standardized identifiers and now every vulnerability is described 
with the same attributes and metrics.  A CVE possess a CVE-ID, this identifier is built based 
on a syntax that is CVE + YEAR + ARBITRARY DIGITS, this way the CVE database can 
be listed based on years, and by order of appearance. 
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2.1.4 Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
CVSS [10] [11] is responsible to categorize (in a numerical score) the risk (severity) that a 
vulnerability imposes to a specific product. The numerical score can even be translated into 
a qualitative representation from low to critical to help organizations cyber security risk 
assessment, prioritization and planning. Figure 1 shows the three groups of metrics defined 
by CVSS the base group, the temporal group and the environmental group: 
• Base metrics represent the intrinsic vulnerability characteristics that are constant over 
time and in the user's environment. 
• Temporal metrics represent the characteristics of a vulnerability that are most likely 
to change over time but not in different user environments. 
• The Environmental metrics are the ones that reflect the characteristics of a 
vulnerability concerning a particular environment.  
 
Figure 1 CVSS (Scoring View) [12] 
 
CVSS scores can be used to rate security vulnerabilities (to get an indication of their relative 
severity) affecting a very wide range of software products: operating systems, web and 
legacy applications, security products (firewalls, antivirus software), databases, etc. [13]. 
Every application or service that uses the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
should provide not only the CVSS score, but also a vector describing the components from 
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which the score was calculated. This allows decision makers to validate the score while 
providing a common set of vulnerability attributes to be disclosed [11]. 
 
CVSS vectors containing only base metrics take the following form (Table 1 presents the 
acronyms used in CVSS base metrics):  
(AV: [L, A, N] /AC: [H, M, L] /Au: [M, S, N] /C: [N, P, C] / I: [N, P, C] /A: [N, P, C]) 
The following an example of vector definitions base: 
 (AV: L/AC: H /Au: N /C: N /I: P/A: C) 
Table 1 Vector Definitions Base 
2.1.5 Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL) 
OVAL [14] is an international and community effort to promote open and free cyber security 
content, free to the public. It includes a language to encode system details, and an assortment 
of content repositories held throughout the community. Software tools and services use 
OVAL for the three steps of system assessment: representing system information, expressing 
specific machine states, and reporting the results of an assessment. Use of OVAL [15] also 
provides for reliable and reproducible information assurance metrics and enables 
interoperability and automation among security tools and services. Through interoperability 
use of OVAL provides for automation, one example of which is the U.S. National Institute 
Metric Description Possible Values 
AV   AccessVector (Related exploit range) L= Local access, A = Adjacent 
network, N = Network 
AC AccessComplexity (Required attack 
complexity) 
H= High, M = Medium,  
L = Low 
AU Authentication (Level of authentication 
needed to exploit) 
M= Requires multiple instances, 
S= Requires single instance, 
N = None required 
C ConfImpact (Confidentiality impact)  N = None, P = Partial, 
C = Complete 
I IntegImpact (Integrity impact)  N = None, P = Partial,  
C = Complete 
A AvailImpact (Availability impact)  Possible Values: N = None,  
P = Partial, C = Complete 
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of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) 
effort. OVAL is one of six existing standards SCAP uses to enable automated vulnerability 
management, measurement, and policy compliance evaluation. Besides, the OVAL 
Language and OVAL content are used in numerous information security products and 
services from around the world. 
2.2 IT Infrastructure Data Collection Tools 
This section provides a summary of relevant information about available tools for the 
collection of data related to the technological infrastructure of an organization, including 
vendor contact information. In addition, at the end of the section conclusions about the most 
appropriate tool for the development of the decision support system proposed in this thesis 
are presented. 
 
A comparative study identifying the main features and properties of the most relevant tools 
for collecting information on the IT infrastructure is presented next, and the most suitable 
and convenient for the development of a decision support system in the cyber security 
domain is chosen. Tools properties are presented in tabular form in Table 3, properties 
definitions and tools assessment must be understood as follows. If a field in the table for a 
particular tool contains no information, that means either that the field was not relevant for 
that tool, or that the information could not be found on the supplier’s Web site on one of the 
NIST or MITRE Web sites mentioned above. 
 
Tool identifies the name of tool. Purchase Type identifies the way in which the tool can be 
purchased: Appliance or Software. If the tool is distributed on an appliance, unless explicitly 
noted, the appliance is presumed to include an operating system and hardware, so those fields 
in the tool’s table will be left blank. Free Version identifies if the tool has a free version, the 
corresponding field of the table will be filled with the word “Yes” otherwise “No”. License 
identifies the type of license under which the tool is distributed: Commercial, Shareware, 
Open Source, or Freeware. CPE, identifies if the tool supports this standard. The table will 
be filled with the word “Yes” or “No”. CCE, identifies if the tool implements this type of 
specification. The table will be filled with the word “Yes” or “No”. Standards, identifies 
relevant standards to which the tool is compliant with. This includes only standards directly 
relevant to vulnerability analysis, i.e., SCAP, OVAL, CVE, CWE, and CVSS. Standards for 
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configuration checking (e.g., XCCDF, FDCC) and other types of analyses are not included. 
For tools, not compliant with any such standards, this field is left blank. Entries in this field 
are based on supplier claims of standards compliance (some supplier claims are in the 
process of being validated by the responsible standards bodies and the tools do not yet appear 
on validated products lists). OS Support, identifies the operating system(s) (OS) on which a 
software tool runs. This field will also identify any other software that is required for the 
product to run (e.g., database, .NET framework, browser). Supplier, identifies the full name 
of the organization or individual that developed and distributes the tool. For suppliers that 
are non-U.S.-based, the country in which their headquarter are (or, for individuals, in which 
they reside) is noted in parentheses. Decision Support, identifies if the tool supports features 
of vulnerability detection and identification of remediation measures on a scale of 
prioritization. The table will be filled with the word “Yes” or “No”. Export Results, identifies 
the format to which the results can be exported (information about the ICT infrastructure 
assets), for example XML, CSV, etc. Information, identifies the URL to the supplier’s 
information about the tool. The set of tools studied are enumerated and described next: 
2.2.1 Nessus Home 
Nessus is one of the most popular and capable vulnerability scanners, particularly for UNIX 
systems. It was initially free and open source, but source code was closed in 2005 and 
removed the free “Registered Feed” version in 2008. A free “Nessus Home” version is also 
available, though it is limited and only licensed for home network use [16]. Nessus® Home 
allows to scan a personal home network (up to 16 IP addresses per scanner) with the same 
high-speed, in-depth assessments and agentless scanning convenience that Nessus 
subscribers enjoy [17]. 
 
Nessus is the most trusted vulnerability scanning platform for auditors and security analysts. 
Users can schedule scans across multiple scanners, use wizards to easily and quickly create 
policies, schedule scans and send results via email [18]. Reports generated by Nessus use 
standards as CPE, CVE and CVSS which can be exported in different formats as CVS, 
HTML, PDF, Nessus and NessusBD.  
Nessus features color-coded indicators along with corresponding values, that allow to 
quickly assess scan’s data, to help understand an organization’s vulnerabilities. Each scan 
shows a vulnerabilities list, sorted by severity. It also includes compliance checks, this list 
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displays counts and details sorted by vulnerability severity. In addition, the scan's results 
include remediation information, this list displays all remediation details, sorted by the 
number of vulnerabilities. 
2.2.2 Saint 
SAINT (originally Security Administrator’s Integrated Network Tool) [18] is a suite of 
integrated products that perform vulnerability scanning, assessment, and validation on 
network devices, operating systems, databases, desktop applications, Web applications, and 
other targets. The tool suite includes SAINTscanner, an agentless vulnerability assessment 
tool that can perform both authenticated and unauthenticated vulnerability scans that uncover 
areas of weakness on the target, and recommend remediation. SAINTscanner not only 
detects weaknesses but also identifies remediation that can be applied to them before those 
weaknesses can be exploited by intruders. It provides information on how to implement 
those remediation, including pinpointing the most exploitable vulnerabilities for which 
remediation should be applied first. SAINTscanner’s database of vulnerability checks and 
exploits is automatically updated each day with new checks/exploits, enabling it to anticipate 
many common system vulnerabilities. It reports the presence of exploits, the detected 
vulnerabilities’ CVSS score, the identification of the vendor whose product is found to 
harbor the vulnerability, and other useful information.  
2.2.3 Nmap (ZenMap) 
Nmap known as Network Mapper is a free and open source (license) utility for network 
discovery and security auditing. Many systems and network administrators also find it useful 
for tasks such as network inventory, managing service upgrade schedules, and monitoring 
host or service uptime. Nmap uses raw IP packets in novel ways to determine what hosts are 
available on the network, what services (application name and version) those hosts are 
offering, what operating systems (and OS versions) they are running, what type of packet 
filters/firewalls are in use, and dozens of other characteristics. In addition to the classic 
command-line Nmap executable, the Nmap suite includes an advanced GUI and results 
viewer (Zenmap), a flexible data transfer, redirection, and debugging tool (Ncat), a utility 
for comparing scan results (Ndiff), and a packet generation and response analysis tool 
(Nping) [8]. 
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Through the execution of commands in Nmap, you can obtain an XML data file showing the 
main information of the scan such as host name, address, open ports, services and CPE 
(Common Platform Enumeration). This information is compared to CVE (Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures) allowing to check system vulnerabilities. However, Nmap by 
itself doesn't tell the existence of vulnerabilities on a system. Based on the scanning results 
and on user knowledge of computer networking and of the network baseline, the Nmap user 
may be able to figure out what vulnerabilities exist and address them to improve the overall 
security posture. Therefore, when compared to other tools, Nmap doesn’t support corrective 
measures for the vulnerabilities found or prioritization of remediation measures. 
2.2.4 eEye Retina 
Retina Security Scanner [19] supports features to efficiently identify IT exposures and 
prioritize remediation measures in an enterprise-wide scale. The main features of this tool 
are: 
• Continually monitor and improve enterprise security posture. 
• Identify IT assets and sensitive data across disparate environments. 
• Find security exposures in network, web, database and virtual assets. 
• Prioritize remediation based on real risk to critical assets. 
• Easily deploy and scale from small to large environments. 
• Realize optimal performance via non-intrusive scanning. 
• Get fast, frequent updates from the BeyondTrust Research Team. 
 
Retina Network vulnerability [18] scanning is also offered in a free SaaS package, Retina 
Community, that allows free vulnerability assessments and SCAP [5] configuration 
compliance scans across the operating systems, applications, devices, and virtual 
environments at up to 32 target IP addresses, with reports generated in eXtensible Markup 
Language (XML) [20], comma-separated values (CSV) [21], and Portable Document Format 
(PDF). In addition, Retina contains in its reports suggestions for remediating the security 
weaknesses. Scan results can be sorted by machine (host), by vulnerability, or by CVE/IAV 
findings. Vulnerabilities can be sorted by name, risk, or severity code. It is also possible to 
specify the level of detail and display options such as page breaks and optional job metrics 
or detailed audit status [22]. 
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2.2.5 GFI LANguard 
GFI LANguard [18] is a network security scanner and patch management solution that 
assists in patch management, vulnerability management, network and software auditing, 
asset inventorying, change management, risk and compliance analysis. GFI LanGuard [23] 
supports machines across Microsoft®, MAC OS X® and Linux® operating systems as well 
as many third-party applications. It includes its own vulnerability assessment database that 
checks for 2,000+ CVEs and SANS Top 20 vulnerabilities. The database is regularly updated 
with information from Bugtraq, SANS, CVE, Microsoft security updates, and GFI 
Software’s and other community-based information repositories. 
 
Scan results can be exported in XML format. GFI also offers a freeware version, intended 
for personal use, and capable of scanning up to five IP addresses. The freeware version of 
GFI LANguard provides all functions found in the commercial version with the exception 
of patch management for non-Microsoft applications [18]. GFI LanGuard presents a 
functionality for Vulnerability Management through a graphic threat level indicator that 
provides a weighted assessment of the vulnerability status of a scanned computer or group 
of computers, and whenever possible, a Web link for more information on a particular 
security issue. Any detected vulnerabilities can be managed by selecting to remediate, 
ignore, acknowledge or re-categorize as appropriate. 
2.2.6 nCircle IP360 
nCircle IP360 [18] is a component of nCircle’s security risk and compliance management 
suite. Using agentless technology, IP360 profiles all networked devices and tests for the 
presence of more than 40,000 conditions (OSs, applications, vulnerabilities, configurations). 
IP360 includes integrated Web application scanning to identify security risk in Web 
applications. IP360 provides, as an option, the nCircle Perimeter Profiler (a cloud-based 
virtualized appliance) to scan Internet facing assets for network, operating system, and Web 
application vulnerabilities, in the same way it scans assets on the internal network. 
 
IP360 uses advanced analytics and a unique quantitative scoring algorithm based on several 
factors—including the vulnerability score and business-relevant asset value—to prioritize 
the vulnerabilities for remediation. The result is actionable data that enables IT security 
teams to focus on the tasks that will quickly and effectively reduce overall network risk with 
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the fewest possible resources [24]. Furthermore, IP360 has support for the following 
standards: SCAP, OVAL, CVE, CVSS. 
2.2.7 Security System Analyzer 2.0 Beta 
SSA (Security System Analyzer) [25] [18] is free non-intrusive OVAL, FDCC, XCCDF and 
SCAP scanner. It provides security testers and auditors with an advanced overview of the 
security policy level applied. It can identify vulnerabilities and security discrepancies 
through its OVAL interpreter and large database of OVAL vulnerability definitions. Findings 
can be output in CSV. The main features of this tool are: 
• Fully support of open security standards and initiatives (CVE, OVAL, CCE, CPE, 
CWE, SCAP, CVSS). 
• Perform Compliance and Security Checks using the XCCDF - The eXtensible 
Configuration Checklist Description Format. 
• Qualifying the vulnerabilities using CVSS v2.0 scoring.  
 2.2.8 OpenVas 
The Open Vulnerability Assessment System (OpenVAS) [26] is a framework of several 
services and tools. The core of this SSL-secured service-oriented architecture is 
the OpenVAS Scanner. The scanner very efficiently executes the actual Network 
Vulnerability Tests (NVTs) which are served via the OpenVAS NVT Feed or via a 
commercial feed service. All clients run on Windows, Linux, and other OSs. The third-party 
tools integrated into the OpenVAS framework are Nikto, Nmap, ike-scan, snmpwalk, amap, 
ldapsearch, Security Local Auditing Daemon, Ovaldi OVAL interpreter, pnscan, portbunny, 
strobe, and w3af [18]. 
 
As for support for making decisions OpenVAS allows assessment of vulnerabilities, access 
control and intrusion, and assessment risk using the CVSS scoring system. It allows us to 
analyze a PC or a local / remote server and perform various types of reports on detected 
vulnerabilities. In addition, adds a correlation engine to interlace everything that has been 
identified / detected and propose associated solutions. The standard adopted for OpenVas is 
OVAL. 
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2.2.9 Nexpose 
Rapid7 Nexpose [27] is a vulnerability scanner that enables to focus on risk that matters 
while greatly reducing the time required to run a successful vulnerability management 
program. NeXpose is offered in four versions [18]:  
1. NeXpose Enterprise®, intended for organizations with large, complex networks of 
more than 1,024 IP addresses; NeXpose Enterprise is intended to be installed on 
dedicated servers that host no other security software (e.g., no IPS, IDS, virus 
scanner, etc.). 
2. NeXpose Consultant is intended for use by independent security consultants and 
auditors, and designed to run on a laptop; it also provides configuration features that 
tune the tool for one-time integrated scans/tests. 
3. NeXpose Express is intended for small-to-medium sized businesses (Class C 
networks with 256 IP addresses or fewer), and also intended to be deployed on a 
laptop. 
4. NeXpose Community is a free, single-user edition intended for single user or home 
business use on networks of 32 or fewer IP addresses; the Community version lacks 
custom scan and report configuration, email alert, Web application scanning, 
compliance/configuration scanning, and provides only limited reporting (XML 
format only). 
 
Table 2 shows in more detail the functionalities presented by the Enterprise Nexpose version, 
which is the most complete versus the Community version. 
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Functionalities Enterprise Community 
General 
Max Number of IPS Unlimited Up to 30 
Number of users Unlimited One 
Number of scan engines 
included 
Unlimited One 
Licensing model Perpetual Free 
Collect 
Run one scan for multiple 
compliance reports 
Yes  Yes 
Automatic vulnerability updates 
and Microsoft Patch Tuesday 
vulnerability updates 
Yes  Yes 
Scan scheduling and alerting Yes  Yes 
Web application scanning Yes  
PCI compliance Yes  
Advanced report and scan 
customization 
Yes  
Open API™ and third-party 
Integrations 
Yes  
Policy manager Yes  
Virtual scanning (Vmware 
NSX) 
Yes  
Dynamic discovery scanning 
(Vmware, Mobile) 
Yes  
Distributed scanning Yes  
Adaptive Security with 
automated actions 
Yes  
Dynamic, live dashboards with 
50+ cards 
Yes  
Scan IP addresses belonging to 
third parties 
  
 
Prioritize 
Exception management Yes Yes 
Interactive charting Yes  Yes 
Dynamic Asset Groups and 
Tagging 
Yes  Yes 
Custom Tags and System 
Criticality Tags 
Yes  
Report Templates and 
Uploading 
Yes  
Integrated vulnerability 
validation with Metasploit 
Yes  
continue 
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continue 
Customizable threat models Yes  
 
Remediate 
Executive and remediation 
reporting 
Yes  Yes 
User Role Customization Yes  
 
Remediation Workflow Yes  
Deployment Options 
Software Installation Yes  Yes 
Virtual Appliance Yes  Yes 
Private Cloud Yes  
Physical Appliance Yes  
Managed Service Yes  
 
Support 
Online Support Yes Community 
Assigned Account Manager Yes  
Phone Support Yes  
2-hour response for severity 1 
issues 
Yes  
 
Table 2 Functionalities Enterprise and Community Nexpose Version [28] 
 
The tool also provides detailed remediation guidance that includes time estimates, exploit 
risk score, and asset criticality. Nexpose prioritizes mitigation tasks to reduce overall risk as 
quickly as possible. For example, within Nexpose you can use the Prioritized Remediation 
report to determine which patches have the highest impact in reducing risk to your 
environment.  Nexpose categorizes vulnerabilities with a CVSS score. The standards 
adopted for Nexpose are CPE, CCE, SCAP, CVE and CVSS. Nexpose also has an option of 
Reporting Data Model which is a dimensional model that allows customized reporting. The 
implementation of the Reporting Data Model is accomplished using the PostgreSQL 
relational database management system, version 9.0.13. As a result, the syntax, functions, 
and other features of PostgreSQL can be utilized when designing reports against the 
Reporting Data Model. The Reporting Data Model is available as an embedded relational 
schema that can be queried against using a custom report template. With Nexpose it is 
possible to apply tags to indicate the locations of the assets. It is possible then to create 
reports based in these tags and assess the risk of the assets by location. This option is known 
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as Applying Real Context with tags that allows the tracking of assets in an organization, to 
identify, group, and report on them according to how they impact the business [29]. 
 
 
Figure 2  User Added Tags Nexpose [29] 
 
As we can see in Figure 2, a Nexpose user can easily gain context into a specific asset. He 
knows that this asset falls under PCI Compliance, lives in the DMZ somewhere, and this 
asset is really critical to his business. In addition, the asset is owned by “John Smith” and is 
located somewhere in Austin. This allows to gain real insight into how to tackle risks that 
are found on this asset now, and in the future. This also helps simplify the overall workflow. 
If a new risk is discovered on this asset in the future, it is known how to tackle the problem 
[29]. 
 
2.2.10 QualysGuard 
The Qualys Cloud Platform [30], also known as QualysGuard, consists of an integrated suite 
of solutions to help organizations simplify security operations and lower the cost of 
compliance by delivering critical security intelligence on demand and automating the full 
spectrum of auditing, compliance and protection for IT systems and web applications. 
QualysGuard includes Vulnerability Management (VM), a cloud service that gives you 
immediate, global visibility into where your IT systems might be vulnerable to the latest 
Internet threats and how to protect them. It helps you to continuously secure your IT 
infrastructure and comply with internal policies and external regulations [31]. Furthermore, 
Qualys separates reporting from scanning, enabling to use a wide range of filters to explore 
the vulnerability findings. It is possible to look for specific types of vulnerabilities and use 
criteria from Qualys’s KnowledgeBase such as severity, business risk, CVSS scores, 
existence of exploits or malware, and whether patches are available [32]. 
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Tool Purchase 
Type 
Free 
Version 
License CPE CCE Standards SO Support Supplier  Decision 
Support  
Export 
Results 
Information 
Nessus Home Software Yes Freewa
re/ 
Comme
rcial 
Yes  CVE, CVSS, 
SCAP only 
for paid 
version  
Windows, 
Mac OS X, 
Free BSD, 
Linux 
Tenable 
Network 
Security® 
Yes HTML 
CSV 
Nessus DB 
(.db) 
https://www.tenable.co
m/products/nessus-
home 
Saint8 Software, 
Appliance, 
or SaaS 
No Comme
rcial 
Yes Yes CVE, CVSS, 
OVAL, 
SCAP 
Linux, Mac 
OS X 
SAINT 
Corp. 
Yes CSV 
json-
formatted 
https://www.saintcorpo
ration.com/products/SA
INT8.html 
Nmap 
(ZenMap) 
Software Yes Open 
Source 
Yes   Windows, 
Linux, Mac 
OS X 
Nmap  No XML https://nmap.org/ 
eEye Retina  
 
Software Yes 
(Trial) 
Comme
rcial 
Yes  CVE, CVSS, 
OVAL, 
SCAP 
Windows eEye 
Digital 
Security® 
Yes XML 
CSV 
https://www.beyondtru
st.com/products/retina-
network-security-
scanner/ 
GFI 
LANguard 
 
Software Yes 
(Trial) 
Comme
rcial 
  CVE, OVAL Windows, 
Linux, Mac 
OS X 
GFI 
Software 
Yes XML http://www.gfi.com/lan
netscan 
nCircle® 
IP360 
 
Appliance No Comme
rcial 
Yes  CVE, CVSS, 
OVAL, 
SCAP 
 nCircle 
Network 
Security, 
Inc. 
Yes CSV 
XML 
https://www.tripwire.co
m/it-security-
software/enterprise-
vulnerability-
management/tripwire-
ip360/ 
Security 
System 
Analyzer 2.0 
Beta 
Software Yes Open 
Source 
Yes  CVE, CVSS, 
XCCDF, 
OVAL, 
SCAP 
Windows NETpeas, 
Societe 
Anonyme 
(SA) 
(Morocco) 
Yes CSV https://code.google.co
m/archive/p/ssa/  
 
 
 
continue 
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OpenVas Software, 
Appliance, 
or SaaS 
Yes OpenSo
urce 
  OVAL Windows, 
Linux 
Atomic 
Corporatio
n’s 
OpenVAS 
Project 
(Germany) 
Yes XML, 
HTML, 
PDF 
http://www.openvas.or
g/software.html 
Nexpose Software Yes Comme
rcial 
Yes Yes CVE, CVSS, 
SCAP 
Windows, 
Linux,  
VMWare 
Virtual 
Appliance 
Rapid7 Yes XML, 
HTML, 
PDF. 
 
https://www.rapid7.co
m/es/products/nexpose 
QualysGuard SaaS Yes 
(Trial) 
Comme
rcial 
  CVE, CVSS, 
SCAP 
 Qualys, Inc Yes HTML, 
MHT, 
PDF, CSV, 
and XML 
https://www.qualys.co
m/suite/vulnerability-
management/features/ 
Table 3 IT Infrastructure Data Collection Tools. 
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2.3 Tools Comparison  
This section presents a comparative study identifying the main features of the most relevant 
tools for collecting information on the ICT infrastructure, in order to choose the most suitable 
and convenient for the development of a decision support system in the cyber security 
domain. The criteria established for the characterization and evaluation of the tools are: If 
the tool has a free version (Free Version); Type of license under which the tool is distributed 
(License), Commercial, Shareware, Open Source, or Freeware;  If the Common Platform 
Enumeration standard is supported (CPE); If the Common Configuration Enumeration 
standard is supported (CCE); Relevant standards to which the tool is compliant with 
(Standards), which includes only standards directly relevant to vulnerability analysis, i.e., 
SCAP, OVAL, CVE, CWE, and CVSS; The operating system(s) (OS) on which a software 
tool runs (OS Support); If the tool supports functionalities for vulnerability detection, 
identification and prioritization of remediation measures (Decision Support); Format to 
which the results can be exported (Export Results), e.g. information about the assets, 
exported to XML, CSV, etc. 
 
For the selection of the most suitable tool to be adopted in the following stages of this thesis, 
each criteria was assigned a weight, according to its relevance in the context of the thesis. 
The criteria and their weights are presented next. Free Version, the value of “3” is assigned 
to the tool that has a free version available without a time limit, “2” for one that has a free 
version but has a limit number of days (usually 30 days) and “1” for one that does not have 
a free version. License, this metric is defined according to the type of license, in the case of 
being open source the assigned value is “3”, if it is freeware “2” and in case of being 
commercial the assigned value is “1”. CPE, CCE, Decision Support, in the case of the CCE, 
CPE and decision support criteria, value “2” or value “1” is assigned to indicate the 
corresponding tool compliance or not compliance, respectively. Standards, OS Support and 
Export Results, these criteria are quantified in Table 4, according to the number of standards 
used by the tool, the operating systems it supports or the number of formats available to 
export the results. Three is the highest value, for example in case a tool uses more than 3 
security standards.  
 
  
 22 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Weighing Standards, SO Support, Export Results 
 
Table 5 shows the overall results according to the established metrics. 
Table 5 Results Comparison Tools 
As described previously, Nexpose is ranked first with a total of 19 points, followed by Nessus 
Home with 18 points. In this way, it can be concluded that Nexpose is the most promising 
tool in the context of the study carried on in this thesis, because it fulfills most criteria in 
comparison with the other tools. Among several properties, we can emphasize that this tool 
supports operating systems such as Windows and Linux. Furthermore, the representation of 
the results (vulnerability reports) is based on standards such as CPE, CVE and CVSS. This 
information can be exported in various formats such as XML and HTML, allowing 
developers to obtain these data for manipulation and integration with other applications. 
Another important reason for choosing this tool is that it has several features for decision 
support, one of which is to get a full picture of risk across ICT assets, encompassing 
vulnerabilities and configuration issues, presented in easy-to-use customizable reports. This 
enables better decision-making and increases the credibility of the security team across the 
organization. 
Value Weighting 
One 1 
More than 2 2 
More than 3 3 
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Comprehension Level 
 
To implement the comprehension layer of the context aware system proposed in this thesis, 
an (OWL [33]) ontology based knowledge representation was adopted. The role of the 
ontology here is not only to represent/incorporate/integrate the data captured about the ICT 
infrastructure at the perception layer by the tool described in the previous section, but also 
to allow domain/corporations specific knowledge to be added by cyber security experts (e.g. 
Chief Information Security Officers - CISO). Experts are allowed to introduce new specific 
knowledge into the ontology using Protége [34] ontology editor. Assets characterization such 
as asset value and importance of each security dimension associated to that asset (privacy, 
integrity, availability) must be provided by experts and added to the ontology. This 
knowledge is essential to support corporation specific cyber risk analysis and management 
to be performed by the decision aiding software to be developed in our study. 
 
The following sections in this chapter introduce the concepts of ontology, the Web Ontology 
Language (OWL) and related works about ontologies in the cyber security domain. One of 
the most used tools for ontology design and edition (Protégé [34]) is presented and the 
proposed ontology design to be used in the following stages of the thesis is described and 
explained. In order to integrate the ICT infrastructure data characterization generated by 
Nexpose (XML reports), with corporations cyber security experts specific knowledge 
(represented at the ontology level in OWL), existing XML to OWL conversion tools were 
studied and a software component for XML to OWL generation was developed and 
presented in this chapter. 
3.1 Ontology Concepts 
According to one of the most widely accepted definitions of ontology in computer science 
“An ontology is a formal explicit specification of a shared conceptualization for a domain of 
interest.” [35]. It is formal and logic-based, which makes reasoning possible; it has explicit 
specification, which makes it easy for new learners of this domain; it is a shared 
conceptualization, which defines a common vocabulary for researchers who need to share 
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information in this domain. Web Ontology Language (OWL) [33] was approved by World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) to be one of the key Semantic Web technologies in 2004 [36]. 
  
An ontology is not a database, is not a program, and more than a conceptualization it 
represents a view of a knowledge domain. Ontologies allow to cover various targets to enable 
the exchange of data between programs. In addition, ontologies simplify the translation of 
different representations. An ontology is a method applied to a selected domain to formally 
represent the concepts and relationships in it. To develop an ontology is necessary to define 
classes, to establish the hierarchy of classes in taxonomies (subclass, superclass), to set 
relations (properties) and describing values and objects that are related.  
 
One general proposal to the process of building ontologies is given by Noy [37] in the 
comment]: 1) Determine the scope and domain of the ontology; 2) Consider reusing existing 
ontologies; 3) Enumerate important terms in the domain; 4) Define the class hierarchy; 5) 
Define object properties; 6) Define data properties; 7) Create individuals; 8) Publish. 
Noy process of building ontologies was generally followed to build the ontology used in this 
thesis to represent cyber security specific knowledge domain. 
3.2 Web Ontology Language 
One of the languages with great expressive power that has become standard for annotating 
Web ontologies is the Web Ontology Language (OWL). The Web Ontology Language 
(OWL) is an international standard for encoding and exchanging ontologies and is designed 
to support the Semantic Web [33]. In other words, OWL is a standard for the Semantic Web 
that lets to manage, integrate, share and reuse data on the Web. OWL is grounded on the 
Resource Description Framework (RDF) standard. 
 
RDF is a standard model for data interchange on the Web. RDF has features that facilitate 
data merging even if the underlying schemas differ, and it specifically supports the evolution 
of schemas over time without requiring all the data consumers to be changed. RDF extends 
the linking structure of the Web to use URIs to name the relationship between things as well 
as the two ends of the link (this is usually referred to as a “triple”). Using this simple model, 
it allows structured and semi-structured data to be mixed, exposed, and shared across 
different applications [38]. 
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OWL provides more vocabulary for describing properties and classes than RDF: disjoint 
classes, relationships between classes, cardinality, equality, properties, characteristics of 
properties, and enumerated classes. OWL has 3 sub-languages, OWL Lite, OWL Description 
Logic (DL) and OWL Full. For the sake of simplicity, it can be said that OWL Lite is an 
extremely simple least expressive OWL dialect, OWL DL provides a grateful expressiveness 
and allows fairly advanced description logics reasoning capabilities, and OWL Full which is 
the most expressive OWL dialect, it allows free syntactical as RDF, but is highly unlikely 
that any reasoning software is able to support complete reasoning for every feature of OWL 
Full. In this thesis, like in most semantic web based applications, OWL DL was adopted to 
design and build the ontology used for the semantic level knowledge representation. The 
ontology is presented and explained in the following sections of the thesis. 
3.3 Cyber Security Ontology Related Studies  
Due to the advantages of representing knowledge in the form of ontologies, several studies 
in the cyber security domain made use of (OWL) ontologies. A literature revision was 
performed on cyber security ontologies in the context of the current thesis. The knowledge 
made available by the means of cyber security ontologies scientific publications, was taken 
into consideration in the process of building the ontology proposed in this thesis. This 
allowed to reuse cyber security domain specific vocabulary, concepts, relations and 
(description logics) rules published in this scientific area. The scientific publications that 
most influenced the design of the ontology proposed in this thesis are briefly presented and 
explained next. 
 
“Ontologies for Modeling Enterprise Level Security Metrics” [39], the main goal of this 
paper is the development an ontology that has knowledge about which threats endanger 
which assets and which counter measures can reduce the probability of a damage. This 
ontology can enable a quantitative risk analysis so that the manager of an enterprise can 
choose the appropriate safeguard mechanism to reduce the threats to their enterprise. This 
work presents a model for Enterprise Level Security, discusses application of the ontology 
for collecting and querying data on security metrics. 
 
“Ontology-Based Evaluation of ISO 27001” [40], in this paper a metamodel of the ISO 
27001 security standard explaining its core concepts is presented. A comparison is also made 
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about the constructed metamodel with various information security ontologies. The paper 
discusses their application and present the basic ideas of applying qualitative data analysis 
(QDA), after a brief overview of related works. 
 
“Formalizing Information Security Knowledge” [41], this paper describes a security 
ontology which provides an ontological structure for information security domain 
knowledge. Besides existing best-practice guidelines such as the “German IT Grundschutz 
Manual”. An evaluation conducted by an information security expert team has shown that 
this knowledge model can be used to support a broad range of information security risk 
management approaches. 
 
“An Ontology Based Approach to Information Security” [42], this paper presents a 
conceptual implementation model of an ontology defined in the security domain. The model 
presented contains the semantic concepts based on the information security standard 
ISO/IEC_JTC1, and their relationships to other concepts, defined in a subset of the 
information security domain. 
 
“A Security Ontology for Security Requirements Elicitation” [43], this paper presents a 
core and generic security ontology for security requirements engineering. Its core and 
generic status is attained thanks to its coverage of wide and high-level security concepts and 
relationships. This work implemented the ontology and developed an interactive 
environment to facilitate the use of the ontology during the security requirements 
engineering process. The proposed security ontology was evaluated by checking its validity 
and completeness compared to other ontologies. 
 
“Ontologies for Security Requirements: A Literature Survey and Classification” [44], 
this paper is a survey, it proposes an analysis and a typology of existing security ontologies 
and their use for requirements definition. This work is part of a larger project aiming to 
improve security requirement definition using ontologies. The main objective in this paper 
was to review, analyze, select and classify security ontologies, as a scope study but with a 
particular interest in the field of security requirements engineering. 
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“Towards a new generation of security requirements definition methodology using 
ontologies” [45], this research proposes to include ontologies into the requirements 
engineering process. The main goal of this work was to take advantage of the existing 
security and domain ontologies, and propose mechanisms and techniques to use them in an 
approach that guides the definition and analysis of security requirements for a particular 
domain of activity. 
 
As suggested by Noy [37] in one of the steps leading the process of building ontologies 
(“Consider reusing existing ontologies”), the ontology proposed in this thesis adopted as 
much as possible the cyber security knowledge represented in the above-mentioned 
ontologies, with adaptations specifically designed to serve the purpose of the current thesis.  
3.4 Ontology Editor: Protégé 
Protégé [34]  is a free, open-source ontology editor and framework for building intelligent 
systems. It is one of the most widely used ontology editor, is supported by a strong 
community of academic, government, and corporate users, who use Protégé to build 
knowledge-based solutions in areas as diverse as biomedicine, e-commerce, and 
organizational modeling.  Moreover, Protégé’s plug-in architecture can be adapted to build 
both simple and complex ontology-based applications. Developers can integrate the output 
of Protégé with rule systems or other problem solvers to construct a wide range of intelligent 
systems. Protégé fully supports the latest OWL 2 Web Ontology Language and RDF 
specifications from the World Wide Web Consortium. Protégé was adopted in this thesis for 
ontology design and edition.  
 3.5 Study of Tools for Generation of OWL ontology from 
XML Data Source 
Although the data generated by Nexpose is represented using the eXtensible Markup 
Language (XML) which can be used as data exchange format in different domains, XML 
covers only the syntactic level and lacks support for semantic representation and reasoning. 
Ontologies can provide a semantic representation of domain knowledge which supports 
efficient reasoning and expressive power. One of the most popular ontology languages is the 
Web Ontology Language (OWL). It can represent domain knowledge using classes, 
properties, axioms and instances for the use in a distributed environment such as the World 
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Wide Web [46]. There are different methods and tools that enable the generation of an 
ontology from an XML resource. The main tools found in the literature for this purpose are 
described next: 
• JXML2OWL  
JXML2OWL [47] is a framework divided in two sub projects: JXML2OWL API and 
JXML2OWL Mapper. The API is a generic and reusable open source library for mapping 
XML schemas to OWL ontologies for the Java platform while the Mapper is an application 
with a graphical user interface (GUI) developed in Java Swing that uses the API and eases 
the mapping process. JXML2OWL supports manual mappings from XML, XSD or DTD 
documents to an OWL ontology, thus supporting all the kinds of mappings such as many-to-
many. Currently, conditional mappings through XPath predicates are not implemented 
within the framework. According to the mapping performed, JXML2OWL generates 
mapping rules wrapped in an XSL document that allows the automatic transformation of any 
XML data, that is, any XML document validating against the mapped schema, into instances 
of the mapped ontology. Figure 3 represents such process. 
 
 
Figure 3 JXML2OWL Supports Mappings and Instances Transformation [47] 
 
With JXML2OWL, the mapping process requires several steps. The first step consists in 
creating a new mapping project and loading both the XML Schema related file (XSD or 
DTD) and the OWL ontology. If an XML schema in not available, it is possible to load an 
XML document. In this case, JXML2OWL extracts a possible schema. In the second step, 
the user creates class mapping between elements of the loaded XML schema and classes of 
the ontology. Once these mappings are created, it is possible to relate them to each other to 
create object property mappings, or to relate them with elements of the XML schema to 
create datatype property mappings. Finally, in the last step, it is possible to export the 
transformation rules, generated according to the mapping performed, as an XSL document. 
With this XSL document, it is possible to transform any XML document which validates 
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against the mapped XML schema into individuals of the mapped OWL ontology. Obviously, 
both the API and the Mapper support all these steps. 
 
• X2OWL 
X2OWL [48] [49] is a tool implemented within OWSCIS framework to handle the wrapping 
of single XML data sources to local ontologies. This tool is deployed inside a data provider 
to tackle two tasks: 1) Create a local ontology from a single XML data source, and 2) 
Translate SPARQL queries over the local ontology into XQuery queries over the local XML 
data source. This method is based on XML schema to automatically generate the ontology 
structure, as well as, a set of mapping bridges. The method also includes a refinement step 
that allows to clean the mapping bridges and possibly to restructure the generated ontology. 
 
This process is based on some mapping rules that indicate how to convert each component 
of the XML schema to a semantically corresponding ontology component. During ontology 
generation process, X2OWL also generates a mapping document that describes the 
correspondences between the XML data source and the generated local ontology. The 
mapping document is expressed using the proposed mapping specifications: XOML.  
 
The created ontology is described in OWL-DL language. It plays the role of the local 
ontology within the data provider. The generated ontology only describes the concepts and 
properties but not the instances. Data instances are retrieved and translated as needed in 
response to user queries. During ontology generation process (see Figure 3), X2OWL also 
generates a mapping document that describes the correspondences between the components 
of the XML data source and those of the generated local ontology.  
 
• Automatic Generation of OWL Ontology from XML Data Source [46] 
This method uses the same notations used in [48] with some modifications to apply on 
multiple XML data sources. The approach is based on XML schema to build the ontology. 
If the schema does not exist, it can be automatically generated from the source XML 
document, this method copes with all possible complex cases arising from different XML 
schema design styles. The generation of OWL ontology from XML data sources could be 
described in 4 steps (see Figure 4):  
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1. The XML document is transformed to XML-Schema using the Trang API for java. 
The Trang takes as input a schema written in XML syntax and produces as output a 
schema written in XML-Schema.  
2. The XML-Schema is analyzed using XML-Schema Object Model (XSOM). XSOM 
is a Java library that allows applications to easily parse XML Schema documents and 
inspect information in them. It is expected to be useful for applications that take XML 
Schema as an input.  
3. The output of XSOM is used as input for the Java Universal Network/Graph 
framework (JUNG) [16]. The JUNG is used for graph-based manipulations. It 
generates XML- Schema Graph (XSG) that describes the schema in the same way 
whatever its design style is. An XSG is composed of a vertex set, and an edge set. 
The vertex set contains all elements, attributes, nonprimitive types, element groups 
and attribute groups. The edge set contains the edges established:  
• From each element to its type (if not primitive). 
• From each type, element group or attribute group to their contained elements 
and/or attributes. 
4. The Jena API [50] uses XSG as input to generate OWL entities. Basically, OWL 
Classes emerge from complex types, element group declarations, and attribute-group 
declarations according to the mapping rules. Object properties emerge from element-
sub element relationships. Datatype properties emerge from attributes and from 
simple types. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 The Generation Process of OWL Ontology from each XML Data Source [46] 
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The method is based on three types of mappings: 
1. OWL classes: two kinds of complex types are distinguished: 1) global, named 
complex types, and 2) local anonymous complex types.  
2. Object properties: Elements (global or local) are not mapped directly to the ontology, 
but the element-sub element relationship in the schema is translated as the proposed 
object property in the ontology.  
3. Datatype properties: Elements of simple types are mapped to the proposed datatype 
properties. When a complex type (global or local) contains an element of a simple 
type (primitive or defined) having as domain the class corresponding to the complex 
type. If the simple type is a primitive XML Schema Definition (XSD) datatype 
(xsd:string, xsd:integer, ….) then the range of the proposed datatype property is this 
datatype.  
 
• Topbraid composer 
TopBraid Composer is a visual modeling environment from industry experts for creating 
and managing domain models and ontologies in the Semantic Web standards RDF, RDFS 
and OWL [51]. TopBraid Composer is based on the Eclipse platform and the Jena API. 
Composer seamlessly integrates logical and rule-based reasoning engines. It offers a 
convenient drag-and-drop, form-based user interface with the ability to view and edit 
ontologies in a variety of serialization formats. Testing, consistency checking and debugging 
is supported by built-in OWL Inference engine, SPARQL query engine and Rules engine. 
TopBraid Composer makes it easier for an enterprise to move to Semantic Web standards 
by importing legacy models including XML Schemas, UML, RDB Schemas and 
spreadsheets. Open APIs are available and it can run with the dase back-end for improve 
scalability. 
 
This tool can automatically generate an OWL/RDF ontology from any XML file. Each 
distinct XML element name is mapped into a class, and the elements themselves become 
instances of those classes. A datatype property is generated for each attribute. The nesting 
of the XML elements is stored by means of the composite:child property described in a 
recent blog entry. TopBraid can be used to import arbitrary XML documents into OWL so 
that they can be queried and processed with semantic web tools. The mapping is bi-
directional and lossless so that files can be loaded, manipulated and saved without losing 
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structural information. The conversion occurs automatically, users do not have to worry 
about writing any rules for commonly needed mappings. However, those users that need to 
make further transformations can use SPARQL Rules and SPARQLMotion to customize 
their generated OWL ontology or further transform RDF triples representing the XML data 
[52]. 
 
• XML to OWL Tools Comparison Summary 
As described above some of the tools require more steps than others for generating an 
ontology from a XML resource. With JXML2OWL the mapping process has a number of 
steps, including loading some files as XML Schema related file (XSD or DTD), XML 
instances and the OWL ontology. This way it is possible to relate each of the elements in the 
XML file with the ontology, but this work can be a little confusing and tedious. X2OWL 
works from an XML Schema for the generation of the ontology, being necessary to convert the XML 
file to an XSD format. In addition, the generated ontology only describes the concepts and properties 
but not the instances. Data instances are retrieved and translated as needed in response to user queries.  
TopBraid however is a tool that allows the automatic generation from the XML file for 
ontology, its graphical interface allows easy handling of each of the generated elements such 
as classes, objects and datatype properties. This tool also has other features such as logical 
and rule-based reasoning engines, and it offers a convenient drag-and-drop, form-based user 
interface with the ability to view and edit ontologies in a variety of serialization formats.  
One of the disadvantages of TopBraid is that it is a commercial tool, for this reason a method 
was developed specifically for this thesis, for the transformation of the XML ouptut provided 
by the Nexpose into an OWL ontology. The method proposed in this thesis is presented in 
the next section. 
3.6 Building Semantic Level Cyber Security Context 
Awareness 
A method to build/instantiate the initial (OWL) ontology automatically is proposed in this 
section. The generation method is based on the XML-Schema of Nexpose [53] for the 
construction of the (OWL) ontology. As shown in Figure 5, the generation of OWL ontology 
from XML standards and data sources could be described in 3 steps: 
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1. From the XML-Schema the design of the base ontology (Appendix 1) is performed, 
using Protégé, a tool that provides a graphical interface for the construction of 
ontologies in OWL language. 
2. The Nexpose results XML file is analyzed using the Document Object Model 
(DOM), an application programming interface for Java. In this way Nexpose 
dynamically generated data is obtained and added into the ontology. 
3. Finally, each of the individuals obtained from parsing the XML file is added in the 
base ontology, with the help of the OWL-API for java. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Generation Process of OWL Ontology 
 
• XML to OWL Mapping  
This section defines a notation to specify mappings between elements of Nexpose XML 
Schema and resources of an OWL ontology, which is mainly defined by classes, datatype 
and object properties [47] [54]. Three types of mappings are presented as follows: 
1. Class mapping: Maps an XML node to an OWL concept. 
2. Datatype property mapping: Maps an XML node to an OWL datatype property. 
3. Object property mapping: Relates two class mappings to an OWL object property. 
 
In Table 6 it is possible to observe the notation of the mapping of the vulnerability node in 
relation to the data of the XML schema. 
 
Table 6 Vulnerability Mapping 
Mappings Schema Node XML 
Class Vulnerability 
Datatype property id, title, severity, pciSeverity, 
cvssScore,cvssVector,published,added,modified,riskScore. 
Object property hasVulnerability (between Device and Vulnerability class) 
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The generated OWL ontology is shown in Figure 6. In this ontology, there are twelve locals 
complex types defined within the Location, Device, Software, OperatingSystem, 
Vulnerability, SecurityPillars, Risk, Exploit, Tag, Reference, Description, Solution and 
Malware.  
 
 
Figure 6 OWL Ontology Structure 
 
Tables 7 and 8 show the object properties and datatype properties of the generated ontology, 
respectively. 
 
Datatype Property Domain Range 
id Vulnerability string 
title Vulnerability string 
cvssScore Vulnerability float 
cvssVector Vulnerability string 
pciSeverity Vulnerability integer 
severity Vulnerability integer 
riskScore Vulnerability float 
continue 
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Table 7 The Datatype Properties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 The Object Properties 
 
 
published Vulnerability string 
added Vulnerability string 
modified Vulnerability string 
idExploit Exploit string 
title Exploit string 
type Exploit string 
link Exploit string 
skillLevel Exploit string 
nameReference Reference string 
valueReference Reference string 
nameTag Tag string 
valueTag Tag string 
valueDescription Description string 
paragraph Solution string 
valueMalware Malware string 
isOfEasyPhysicalAccess Location string 
idDevice Device string 
riskScoreDevice Device string 
address Device string 
nameDevice Device string 
Object Property Domain Range 
hasDescription Vulnerability Description 
hasExploit Vulnerability Exploit 
hasReference Vulnerability Reference 
hasSolution Vulnerability Solution 
hasTag Vulnerability Tag 
hasMalware Vulnerability Malware 
affecTo Vulnerability SecurityPillars 
impactRisk Vulnerability Risk 
hasVulnerability Device VulnerabilityDefinitions 
isLocatedIn Device Location 
runsOnSw Device Software 
solvedA Solution Vulnerability 
identifyTo Tag Vulnerability 
isAttactBy SecurityPillars Vulnerability 
isLocationOf Location Device 
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Projection Level - Risk Analysis 
 
This chapter analyzes different tools for ICT infrastructure data collection, vulnerability 
scanning and the support they can provide for cyber security risk assessment and decision 
making in organizations. The criteria used to evaluate, compare and select the most suitable 
tools for this study include cyber security metrics, standards and risk strategies. In addition, 
they are classified and contextualized with respect to the situation awareness layer they 
belong to (perception, comprehension, projection and decision/action). The following 
sections in this chapter introduce a detailed literature review about the tools and a 
comparative analysis of these tools with respect to risk assessment. 
4.1 ICT Infrastructure and Cyber Security Data Collection 
Tools 
Following a detailed literature review on most relevant ICT infrastructure and cyber security 
data collection tools, and having proceeded with an initial shortlisting process, it was 
concluded that a set of nine tools of interest are worth to be addressed in this thesis: Nessus, 
Saint8, Retina Security Scanner, GFI LANGuard, nCircle® IP360, Security System 
Analyzer 2.0, OpenVas, QualysGuard, Nexpose. These tools were analyzed according to the 
following criteria, which are assumed as the most relevant for the tools comparison:  cyber 
security metrics (confidentiality, integrity impact, etc.), standards (CVE, CVSS, etc.) and 
risk strategies supported (real, temporal, weighted). These tools and the corresponding 
analysis are presented in detail next. 
 
Nessus [55] supports the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) standard [10], 
including metrics from versions v2 and v3 simultaneously. If both CVSS2 and CVSS3 
attributes are present, both scores are computed. However, when computing risk factor, the 
CVSS2 score takes precedence. Besides, Nessus includes a risk factor based on CVSS which 
filters results based on the vulnerabilities detected in the ICT infrastructure (e.g., Low, 
Medium, High, Critical). The severity ratings are derived from the associated CVSS score, 
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where 0 is Info, less than 4 is Low, less than 7 is Medium, less than 10 is High, and a CVSS 
score of 10 will be flagged as Critical [56].  
 
Saint8 [57] deals with assets, such as data, personnel, devices, systems and facilities that 
enable the organization to achieve business goals. Stakeholders are involved in risk 
identification and in providing data for computing both technical and business-related cyber 
security metrics, such as business unit, function, criticality and business cost impact. In 
addition, Saint uses CVSS score to create a risk profile to classify (prioritize) vulnerabilities. 
CVSS scores are grouped by severity levels: less than 4 corresponds to Potential risk factor, 
4-7 scores map to Concern risk factor and 7-10 score to Critical.        
                      
Retina Security Scanner [19] assess risk and prioritizes remediation based on Real Risk 
strategy [58] in business context considering assets criticality and vulnerability exploitability 
(evaluated with the help of Core Impact®, Metasploit® and Exploit-db tools), CVSS, and 
other factors [59]. It is available as a standalone application or as part of Retina CS Enterprise 
Vulnerability Management. Retina CS version 5.7 [60] introduces new asset risk analysis, 
allowing the decision maker to “weight” the asset score based on either threat risks (i.e. 
vulnerabilities and attacks) or exposure risks (i.e. ports, shares, services, accounts). To 
normalize the risk according to a company's priorities a scale between 0 and 10 is introduced, 
with lowest score (0) corresponding to asset with lowest risk and with highest score (10) 
corresponding to asset with highest priority.  
 
GFI LANGuard [61] [62] [63] scans the ICT infrastructure (hardware, network, operating 
systems, services, and applications), performs vulnerability analysis, risk assessment, and 
identifies and prioritizes remediation actions using databases such as Open Vulnerability and 
Assessment Language (OVAL) [14] and SANS Top 20 [64]. The tool also provides 
executive and technical reports for business and technical decision support. 
 
nCircle IP360 and Tripware IP360 [65] [66] perform hosts data collection, vulnerability 
scoring and prioritization. Moreover, it also suggests remediation measures and prioritizes 
them. These tools make use of exploitability and vulnerability data from Tripwire's 
Vulnerability and Exposure Research Team (VERT). Business context is taken into account 
within risk assessment. 
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Security System Analyzer 2.0 (SSA) [67] [68] defines a patch management deployment 
strategy using CVSS scores to qualify the vulnerabilities. Also, SSA identifies 
vulnerabilities and discrepancies using the OVAL interpreter and performs compliance and 
security checks using the XCCDF - The eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description 
Format [69]. 
 
OpenVas [70] [26] scanner shows the results of the vulnerabilities prioritized according to 
the impact on the systems (high, medium or low) and indicates the number of vulnerabilities 
found for each impact category. Besides OpenVAS is an official OVAL Adopter and 
OpenVAS-5 is registered as ‘Systems Characteristics Producer’. 
 
QualysGuard [71] manages cyber security vulnerability risks taking into account severity, 
business risk, CVSS scores, existence of exploits, malware and available patches. It provides 
easy and flexible ways for ICT infrastructure scanning and cyber risk reporting. 
 
Nexpose [72] associates CVSS metrics to calculate the risk of a vulnerability on an asset. It 
has different risk strategies which are based on the formula in which factors such as 
likelihood of compromise, impact of commitment, and asset importance are calculated. Each 
formula produces a different range of numeric values. Many of the available risk strategies 
use the same factors in assessing risk, each strategy evaluating and aggregating the relevant 
factors in different ways. The common risk factors are grouped into three categories: 
vulnerability impact, initial exploit difficulty, and threat exposure. The factors that comprise 
vulnerability impact and initial exploit difficulty are the six-base metrics employed in the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Threat exposure data come from three 
variables: Vulnerability age which is a measure of how long the security community has 
known about the vulnerability, Exploit exposure which is the rank of the highest-ranked 
exploit for a vulnerability that measures how easily and consistently a known exploit can 
compromise a vulnerable asset, and Malware exposure which is a measure of the prevalence 
of any malware kits, also known as exploit kits, associated with a vulnerability. The risk 
assessment strategies are: real risk, temporal plus risk, temporal risk, weighted risk and PCI 
ASV risk [73] [74]. 
  
 40 
• Real Risk, Equation 1 shows the formula used to calculate the Real Risk scoring 
model [58]: 
                          Risk = 
CVSS Impact Metrics
CVSS Likelihood Metrics
×  Exposure (Malware Kits
Exploit Rank
, time)                              (1) 
• Temporal Plus, Equation 2 shows the formula used to calculate the Temporal Plus 
scoring model [75]: 
                                                    Risk =  √t   ×  
(1+AV+C+I+A)
(AC+Au)
2                     (2) 
Where (t) is the time-based likelihood and represents the number of days since the 
vulnerability was publicly disclosed. The overall score increases with the number of 
days. The “CVSS” values refer to the various base component vectors of the CVSS 
version 2 which is broken down into 6 metrics, including: Access Vector (AV); 
Access Complexity (AC); Authentication Required (Au); Confidentiality Impact (C); 
Integrity Impact (I) and Availability Impact (A) [74]. 
• Temporal, Equation 3 shows the formula used to calculate the Temporal scoring 
model [75]: 
                                                            Risk = √t   × 
(AV+C+I+A)!
(AC+Au)
2                                         (3) 
• Weighted [72] [73], the Weighted risk model is based primarily on asset data and 
vulnerability types, and it emphasizes the following factors: 1) Vulnerability 
severity, ranging from 1 to 10; 2) Number of vulnerability instances; 3) Type of asset, 
such as a computer, router, or wireless access point (WAP); 4) Number and types of 
services on the asset; 5) The level of importance, or weight, that is assigned to a site 
when you configure it (e.g. low, high). Equation 4 shows the formula defined in the 
Nexpose configuration files for the Weighted scoring mode, this file can be found as 
“vulnsev-scvtype-devclass.xml” [76]. 
Risk = vulnSeverity × 0,02                                                    (4) 
• PCI ASV 2.0 [75] [77], this strategy applies a score based on the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) Version 2.0 to every discovered 
vulnerability. PCI DSS specifies twelve requirements for compliance, among the 
requirements for risk assessment is defined “Vulnerability Categorization” to assist 
in prioritizing the solution or mitigating identified issues. Approved Scanning 
Vendors (ASVs) must assign a severity level to each identified vulnerability (1 = 
lowest severity, 5 = highest severity) and must use two tools to categorize and rank 
vulnerabilities, and determine scan compliance: 1. The Common Vulnerability 
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Scoring System (CVSS) version 2.0 and 2. The National Vulnerability Database 
(NVD). Any vulnerability with a CVSS base score of 4.0 or higher will result in a 
non-compliant scan. 
4.2 Risk Assessment Tools Comparison 
As described in the previous section each tool uses various techniques or strategies for risk-
based prioritization. Most of these tools use CVSS score metrics to assess the risk that a 
vulnerability may pose to the business, either in the tool's own strategies or by adding new 
metrics that allow the user a better understanding of what is happening in the environment. 
In addition, to have more complete data for risk management, many of the tools have 
integration mechanisms with other commercial technology partners to further enhance the 
management of vulnerabilities that can affect an organization. Table 9 shows the tools 
comparison in terms of metrics, proposed strategies and if they support integration 
mechanisms with technology partners.  
 
Tool Metric Strategy Integration mechanisms 
with 
Nessus Home CVSS2, 
CVSS3 
Results based on the risk factor of 
the vulnerability (e.g., Low, 
Medium, High, Critical) 
Kenna, ThreatConnect, 
Cisco ISE, ForeScout 
Saint8 Business 
unit, 
Criticality, 
Business 
cost, 
CVSS 
Prioritization and the application 
of resources to assets based on 
metrics of importance to the 
organization. 
Cisco FireSIGHT 
Management Center 
EyeRetina Business 
impact, 
Core Impact, 
Metasploit, 
Exploit-db, 
CVSS 
Real risk to critical assets and 
exploitability 
Kenna, IBM QRadar 
SIEM, LogRhythm 
 
GFILanguard OVAL, CVE Security issues are rated by their 
severity level and each computer 
is given a risk and vulnerability 
rating. 
Core Security 
Technologies 
 
nCircle® 
IP360 
CVE, CVSS 
OVAL,SCAP 
Prioritizes vulnerabilities, 
manages risk and improves 
security efficacy by combining 
Kenna, IBM QRadar, 
Bringa, LockPath, 
Trusted Integration 
continue 
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business context with vulnerability 
intelligence. 
Security 
System 
Analyzer 
CVE, CVSS,  
OVAL, 
SCAP 
- - 
OpenVAs OVAL The results of the vulnerabilities 
prioritized according to the impact 
on the systems. 
Kenna, Greenbone, 
SecPod 
QualysGuard CVSS, CVE, 
SCAP, 
Severity 
Risk-based approach to 
prioritizing the remediation efforts 
and fixing those vulnerabilities 
that would impact the business. 
Bringa, Modulo, Kenna, 
ForeScout 
LogRhythm 
Nexpose CVE, CVSS, 
SCAP 
Real Risk, Temporal Plus, 
Temporal 
Weighted, PCI ASV 2.0  
Kenna, 
ForeScout,LogRhythm 
Bringa,LockPath, 
Modulo,RSA Security 
Analytics, Risk I/O, 
TraceSecurity, Agiliance, 
R.sam 
Table 9 Comparison of Cyber Security Risk Management Tools. 
 
Although most of the tools use the CVSS metrics for prioritization and risk management, 
some of them incorporate other metrics considered important to an organization. For 
example, Saint8 incorporates “Business unit”, “Criticality” and “Business cost” to know the 
impact that a vulnerability may have on the business. Eye Retina uses “Business impact”, 
“Core Impact Metasploit and Exploitdb” as other metrics to assess risk, and QualysGuard 
uses severity levels based on the CVSS score. It is possible to emphasize that some of the 
tools pose their own risk assessment strategy to support decision making. Among them are 
nCircle® IP360 that combines business context with vulnerability intelligence, Saint8 that 
associates not only the base metrics but also the environment metrics to measure the real risk 
impact on the organization, and Nexpose that incorporates different risk strategies adapted 
to the needs of the business. Another feature to note is the support for integration with other 
technology partners that different tools have. The technology partners provide a specialized 
service for risk assessment and decision support that also incorporates the results of the 
vulnerability scanning tool in a format compatible like XML - eXtensible Markup Language, 
making it more powerful for security and business value analyses. Most of the solutions 
provided by these technology partners are commercial or have a limited trial time, which 
represents a strong constraint for many companies. 
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C3-SEC Requirements, Architecture, 
Integration and Implementation 
 
This chapter describes the software development dimension of the thesis, i.e., C3-SEC 
architecture, design, implementation and integration with Nexpose. First, a high abstraction 
level of the architecture is presented, followed by the technologies used to develop the C3-
SEC decision support system and the corresponding implementation decisions made along 
the software development process. 
5.1 C3-SEC Requirements and Development Methodology 
UWE, UML-based Web Engineering, is applied as a web application oriented methodology 
in the present work. UWE is a methodology for the development of web applications focused 
on the systematic design, customization and semi-automatic generation of scenarios that 
guide the development process. Among the modeling activities of the methodology, the 
following activities belonging to the requirements analysis stage were adapted in the context 
of the current work: functional and non-functional requirements, where the functionalities 
of the system are described in detail and the realization of activity diagrams in which the 
responsibilities and actions of the actors involved are delimited [78]. 
5.1.1 Functional Requirements 
The functional requirements of the application are described in Tables 10,11,12,13 and 14.  
 
Id. Requirement FR01 
Name User Login  
Description Enter username and password to access the application 
Inputs Username, password 
Outputs Admission to the application after verifying that it is a valid user. 
continue 
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Process Authenticating the input data in the database application.  
Preconditions Be a valid user. 
Postconditions Access to the application is granted or not. 
Collateral effect If the username and password are incorrect, warning messages will be 
displayed and will not allow access 
Priority High 
Role executes Ciber security decision maker 
Table 10 Functional Requirement 1 
 
Id. Requirement FR02 
Name Upload XML file 
Description The user must upload the XML file generated in Nexpose. 
Inputs XML file 
Outputs Message with notification of the status of the load. 
Process Transformation of XML file information to OWL ontology.  
Preconditions First login to the application with username and password. 
Postconditions Ontology created based on the information provided by the XML file to 
make the corresponding reports on the vulnerabilities that affect the 
company. 
Collateral effect In case of a problem in the loading process, the user will be notified by a 
warning message. 
Priority High 
Role executes Ciber security decision maker 
Table 11 Functional Requirement 2 
 
  
 45 
Id. Requirement FR03 
Name Company Information Report 
Description The user can view the most relevant information on the state of the 
company's assets as well as graphical reports that indicate the total 
vulnerabilities by category and number of vulnerabilities that affect the 
security pillars. 
Inputs Ontology created by C3-SEC. 
Outputs Report about company information. 
Process Query for the ontology to generate the report.  
Preconditions FR02 
Postconditions The results generated by the inference of the ontology are presented in the 
report. 
Collateral effect In case of a problem in the reporting process, the user will be notified by a 
warning message. 
Priority Medium 
Role executes Ciber security decision maker 
Table 12 Functional Requirement 3 
 
Id. Requirement FR04 
Name Vulnerabilities by Impact Risk Report 
Description User can view vulnerabilities categorized by risk impact (very low, low, 
medium, high, very high). 
Inputs Ontology created by C3-SEC. 
Outputs Vulnerabilities found by impact risk. 
Process Query for the ontology to generate the report.  
continue 
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Preconditions FR02 
Postconditions The results generated by the inference of the ontology are presented in the 
report. 
Collateral effect In case of a problem in the reporting process, the user will be notified by a 
warning message. 
Priority Medium 
Role executes User 
Table 13 Functional Requirement 4 
 
Id. Requirement FR05 
Name Vulnerability Description 
Description The user can see a more detailed description of the vulnerability as well as 
remediation measures and which security pillars it affects. 
Inputs Selected vulnerability of report “Vulnerabilitiess by rsisk impact” 
Outputs Description about selected vulnerability. 
Process Query for the ontology to generate the report.  
Preconditions Select vulnerability of the report "Vulnerabilities by risk impact" 
Postconditions The results generated by the inference of the ontology are presented in the 
report. 
Collateral effect In case of a problem in the reporting process, the user will be notified by a 
warning message. 
Priority Medium 
Role executes User 
Table 14 Functional Requirement 5 
5.1.2 Non-Functional Requirements 
Non-functional requirements of this work are as follows: 
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a) Requirements Interface 
1. The web application language interface will be in English. 
2. The web application lets the user to visualize all ontology required information. 
3. The web application should minimize the ontology topology complexity.  
b) Requirements Navigation 
1. The web application will use consistent and coherent navigation mechanisms, 
improving its the usability of the web application. Allows users to easily identify 
navigation patterns and possible disorientation navigation is prevented. 
2. The web application will have standard navigation buttons (home, back, etc.). 
3. The web application will prevent the opening of pop-ups (pop-ups, because these 
can become cause disorientation in the time window is changed and can cause 
unpredictable results user interface behavior in devices that do not support 
multiple opening more than one windows interfaces). 
c) Usability requirements 
1. The web application will have an attractive and user-friendly interface. 
2. The web application display error messages according to its the activities. 
3. The web application does not allow users to run unfinished operations. 
d) Scalability requirements 
1. The web application will be able to allow maintenance changes and, with new 
features upgrades. 
e) Operational requirements 
1. The web application will have mandatory fields. 
2. The web application restricts invalid data entry for all existing fields. 
3. The web application will validate passwords for user access. 
f) Safety requirements 
1. The web application will handle information with integrity. 
g) Hardware requirements 
1. To implement the Web application there is no restriction in terms of hardware, 
as it is not required to install the application on specific purpose devices or 
computers. 
2. The web application allows proper display in all screen resolutions, however the 
resolution of 1024x768 and higher is recommended to view the entire scene on 
the screen. 
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5.2 C3-SEC System Architecture 
Figure 7 shows a high-level view of the decision support system architecture and all the 
components that take part of it. This architecture is based on the layers of the context-aware 
systems stack (Perception, Comprehension, Projection and Decision/Action). The system is 
composed of five main components that are described next: 
• Component one corresponds to the perception layer, in which the data about the 
technological infrastructure of the organization and its vulnerabilities are obtained 
through the selected tool (Nexpose). The information provided by Nexpose is based 
and compliant with international security standards and metrics (CVSS, CVE, CPE) 
proposed by entities such as NIST and MITRE.  
• Component two and three correspond to the comprehension layer that is in charge of 
the transformation of the information provided by Nexpose in XML format to an 
OWL ontology format. At this level, cyber security experts of an organization are 
allowed to introduce new specific knowledge into the ontology using the Protégé 
ontology editor. Assets characterization such as asset value and importance of each 
security dimension associated to that asset (privacy, integrity, availability) must be 
provided by the organization experts and added to the ontology. This knowledge is 
essential to support corporation specific cyber risk analysis and management. In 
addition, the ontology is extended with new business-related metrics such as cost, 
weight, impact and security pillars (confidentiality, integrity, availability), benefiting 
from the formal logics inference and reasoning and decision aiding features made 
possible by semantic technologies.  
• Finally, part four and five corresponds to the projection and decision / action layer, 
all layers being supported by a web application that provides decision aiding for chief 
information security officers to take appropriate decisions and actions in maintaining 
the security of the organization. 
  
 49 
 
Figure 7 C3-SEC System Architecture 
 
5.3 C3-SEC Integration with Nexpose 
Among the possible approaches for software applications data integration (file transfer, 
shared database, remote procedure invocation and messaging), a XML file transfer/sharing 
approach was adopted and implemented for C3-SEC integration with Nexpose. Additionally, 
a presentation layer integration framework needs to be used for single sign-on and 
transparent, unified graphical user interface, use of Nexpose and C3-SEC. The integrated 
workflow of C3-SEC and Nexpose is currently based on a sequence of steps to produce 
results on threats that can affect the enterprise environment and help at security expert to 
make informed decisions about cybersecurity actions to take.  The UML activity diagram of 
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Figure 8 shows the activities that are carried out in the C3-SEC and Nexpose integration 
workflow. 
 
 
Figure 8 Activities Diagram Activities (C3-SEC Integration with Nexpose) 
 
The activities represented in the diagram of Figure 8 belonging to Nexpose and C3-SEC are 
described in detail in the following sections.   
5.4 Nexpose Features 
Therefore, to obtain the report in XML format containing the information about the 
technological infrastructure of an organization and its vulnerabilities, we must create a site 
with Nexpose (Figure 9). The assets of the organization to be scanned are specified, i.e., 
named, a corresponding IP address is assigned (Figure 10) and eventually extra tags are 
added that help to identify the importance of the asset for the organization. 
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Figure 9 New Site Configuration 
 
 
Figure 10 Adding IP Address 
 
Figure 11 shows the last step of the site configuration which is to save and run the scanning 
process. 
 
 
Figure 11 Save and Scan 
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Once the scan is executed, Nexpose displays a graphical report of the asset status as is shown 
in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12 Scan View of the Computer Science Research Infrastructure Center at ESPE-Ecuador 
 
To generate the report of the scan performed we must usego to the module “Reports” in the 
“Create a report” option and the “Export” tab. Nexpose offers different formats to export the 
results, among them are ARF (Asset Reporting Format), XML format and, Database Export. 
In our study this case we select “XML Export 2.0” must be selected, which contains all data 
available in XML, as well as additional risk fields, associated vulnerabilities and malware 
kits, PCI compliance, site information and scan information. A name mustmay be assigned 
to identify the report (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13 Scan Report XML 
 
The next step is to select the scan to be used  for the report generatation (“Select Scan” in 
Figure 14). 
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Figure 14 Select Scan Option 
 
As shown in Figure 15, the window indicates that must be selected the site in which the scan 
was run must also be selected. Once selected the site click on the “Select Scan” button. 
 
 
Figure 15 Selection Site that was Scanned 
 
Next, in the following window it must select the specific scan instance that serves as input 
for the report has to be selectedthat it wants to report on (Once selected the scan click on the 
“OK” button as shown in Figure 16). 
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Figure 16 Selection Scan Window 
 
Figure 17 shows that the scan selection process is correct and that it is possible tocan 
proceed to save and generate click on the “Save & Run Report” button to generate the 
report. 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Save and Run Report Option 
 
Once the execution is finished, it can see a link that directsto the report generated in XML 
format is shown. Figure 18 shows a list of previously generated reports as example. 
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Figure 18 List Scan Reports 
 
The following section explains each of the modules of the application, in addition the 
integration of the results file in XML format generated by Nexpose. 
5.5 C3-SEC Features System Modules 
This section presents C3-SEC features, including the integration process of XML Nexpose 
reports with C3-SEC. 
5.5.1 User Login  
Figure 19 displays the login page where the user must type his user name and password to 
access the application. 
 
 
Figure 19 User Login  
  
 56 
5.5.2 Upload Module 
When the system is accessed for the first time, the application automatically forwards the 
user to the “Upload” module. This module allows loading the file generated by Nexpose 
with the information about the technological infrastructure and vulnerabilities found in the 
organization, which will be automatically transformed by the application and incorporated 
into the designed ontology. The C3-SEC gives the possibility to create a new ontology based 
on the loaded file or to add the information of the file to the ontology previously created. 
Figure 20 shows the interface to load the Nexpose XML file into C3-SEC. If the load is 
correct, a message will be displayed notifying the user that the load has been successful. 
 
 
Figure 20 Upload Module  
  
5.5.3 C3-SEC Dashboard Module 
The C3-SEC dashboard module shown in Figure 21 presents shows a general corporative 
cyber security situation awareness overview view in terms of security to know the state of 
the company. Figure 21 shows the main asset(s) information such as alias, ip address, total 
vulnerabilities and total risk score, and two reports about the total number of vulnerabilities 
by category and the number of vulnerabilities by security pillar. 
 
 
Figure 21 Dashboard Module  
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5.5.4 Impact Risk Module  
The C3-SEC Impact Risk Module This module provides insights of shows a view of the 
corporations vulnerabilities according to the risk impact they represent for in their businesses 
company (very low, low, medium, high, very high). Each of the vulnerabilities is shown in 
a table categorized by its risk impact (see Figure 22 and Figure 23). 
 
 
Figure 22 Impact Risk Module  
 
 
Figure 23 Vulnerabilities by Impact Risk  
 
In addition, when selecting one of the shown vulnerabilities that are in the tables, C3-SEC 
displays a window with the vulnerability information such as CVSS score, Risk score, 
Description, Security Pillars that it affects and corresponding its remediation actions (, i.e., 
Figure 24). 
 
  
 58 
 
Figure 24 Vulnerability Information Window  
 
5.6 Implementation 
A web application was developed to make the decision support system features available to 
the cyber security professionals (users/decision makers) via a web browser. For the 
development of the web application Java EE [79] development and execution technologies 
were used. Figure 25 shows the core Java EE components adopted in the software developed 
for this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 25 Java EE Technologies for Web Application Development 
 
Among the technologies offered by Java EE framework, the following were especially useful 
and used in this thesis: 
• JSF (Java Server Faces) [80]: The web application was made with JSF 2.2, a 
framework of user interfaces based on Architecture Model View separating its 
components to provide greater control over every part of the application, facilitating their 
development and maintenance. 
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• PrimeFaces [81]: PrimeFaces framework latest version (5.3) was used, which 
contains open source visual components for the whole Java Server Faces 2.2, for the 
creation and design of the web application. 
• Template Bootstrap [82]: For the visual interface of the application Gentelella 
Bootstrap Admin Template was used, which is available for free on its official website. 
 
Model-View-Controller (MVC) design pattern was adopted for the software development, 
which presents well known robust properties and software quality attributes. MVC separates 
business logic with respect to the data (model) and user interface (view / GUI). It allows 
independent changes in each of the parts without affecting the other. In other words, changes 
in the user interface (GUI) do not affect data handling, and data can be reorganized without 
changing the user interface. The description of the MVC components is presented next. 
 
• Model 
The development of this layer implied the definition/implementation of classes showing the 
model of the entities that interact with the application. This allows to access the attributes or 
fields of the ontology and to work with data as objects. The code fragment shown next is a 
representative code fragment of a class model. 
 
public class OperativeSystem { 
    private String vendor; 
    private String family; 
    private String product; 
     
    public OperativeSystem(String vendor, String family, 
String product) { 
        this.vendor = vendor; 
        this.family = family; 
        this.product = product; 
    } 
    public String getVendor() { 
        return vendor; 
    } 
    public void setVendor(String vendor) { 
        this.vendor = vendor; 
    } 
 
   public String getFamily() { 
        return family; 
    } 
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    public void setFamily(String family) { 
        this.family = family; 
    } 
    public String getProduct() { 
        return product; 
    } 
    public void setProduct(String product) { 
        this.product = product; 
    } 
} 
 
 
● Controller 
The controller receives user requests and in response returns the corresponding view. Among 
the relevant classes of this layer is “ManagedBean”, which contains the get and set methods, 
business logic or even unbacking bean methods. For the management of the ontology, the 
following Maven Project dependencies were set: 
1. owlapi-distribution-5.0.4.jar. 
2. owlapi-api-5.0.4.jar. 
3. jfact-5.0.1.jar. 
4. openllet-owlapi-2.5.1.jar 
5. openllet-core-2.5.1.jar 
 
In each of the “Bean” it is necessary to declare the following parameters that allow to upload 
and manage the ontology, as shown in the following code fragment. 
 
   private OWLOntologyManager manager; 
   private IRI documentIRI; 
   private OWLOntology ontology; 
   private OWLReasonerFactory factory = null; 
   private OWLReasoner reasoner; 
   private OWLDataFactory dataFactory; 
 
 
The class constructor should initialize each of the declared objects as shown in the next code 
fragment. 
 
 
    public ImpactRiskBean() { 
        try { 
            // Load an ontology from local 
            PathOntology path = new PathOntology(); 
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            File file = new File(path.getPath()); 
            manager = OWLManager.createOWLOntologyManager(); 
            ontology = 
manager.loadOntologyFromOntologyDocument(file); 
            documentIRI = 
manager.getOntologyDocumentIRI(ontology); 
            factory = new JFactFactory(); 
            OWLReasonerConfiguration config = new 
SimpleConfiguration(500); 
            // Create a reasoner that will reason over our 
ontology and its imports 
            // closure. Pass in the configuration. 
            reasoner = this.factory.createReasoner(ontology); 
            // Ask the reasoner to classify the ontology 
reasoner.precomputeInferences(InferenceType.CLASS_HIERARCHY); 
            dataFactory = manager.getOWLDataFactory(); 
 
        } catch (OWLOntologyCreationException ex) { 
Logger.getLogger(ImpactRiskBean.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, 
null, ex); 
        } 
    }  
 
For data visualization and ontology reasoning in the web application, different methods were 
developed, which allow for reading of individuals, classes, subclasses and properties of the 
ontology. Among the several available reasoners, FaCT ++ a reasoner covering OWL and 
OWL 2 DL-based ontology languages was selected for this project because it is the reasoner 
that best fits the version of the OWL API adopted in the thesis. Pellet (Openllet) reasoner 
was also used, specifically for the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) support. A 
fragment of the method/code that allows to get “individuals” with their respective properties 
of a particular class is given next. 
 
    public List<String> printIndByClass(OWLOntology ont, String    
clase, OWLDataFactory dataFactory, OWLReasoner reasoner) { 
        List<String> listIndByClass = new ArrayList<>(); 
        String base = "http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl"; 
        OWLClass claseInd = dataFactory.getOWLClass(IRI 
                .create(base + "#" + clase)); 
        NodeSet<OWLNamedIndividual> individualsNodeSet = 
reasoner.getInstances( 
                claseInd, true); 
        Set<OWLNamedIndividual> individuals = 
individualsNodeSet.getFlattened(); 
        String individualClass = ""; 
        for (OWLNamedIndividual ind : individuals) { 
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            individualClass = pm.getShortForm(ind).replaceAll(":", 
""); 
            individualClass = individualClass.replaceAll("_", " 
"); 
            listIndByClass.add(individualClass); 
        } 
        return listIndByClass; 
    } 
 
● View 
The view is basically responsible for the user interface and interactions, accepting her/his 
requests and displaying the answers to those requests. Next a code fragment of the view 
component is shown. 
 
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' ?> 
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> 
<ui:composition xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" 
                xmlns:h="http://java.sun.com/jsf/html" 
                xmlns:f="http://java.sun.com/jsf/core" 
                xmlns:ui="http://java.sun.com/jsf/facelets" 
                xmlns:p="http://primefaces.org/ui" 
                template="template.xhtml"> 
    <ui:define name="titlePanel">  
        Form Upload 
    </ui:define> 
    <ui:define name="title2">  
        Dropzone file uploader 
    </ui:define> 
    <ui:define name="contenido">   
        <h:form   enctype="multipart/form-data"> 
            <p>Choose XML file and click "Submit" button to upload 
file.</p> 
            <p:growl id="messages" showDetail="true" /> 
            <p:fileUpload value="#{fileUploadView.file}" 
mode="simple" skinSimple="true" /> 
            <p:separator /> 
            <p:commandButton class="btn btn-round btn-primary" 
value="Submit" ajax="false" 
actionListener="#{fileUploadView.upload}"  /> 
        </h:form> 
    </ui:define> 
</ui:composition> 
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5.6.1 Implementation in the Cloud 
For the implementation and deployment of the web application in the cloud, Amazon Web 
Services EC2 was selected because it provides all the necessary support for the correct 
configuration of the required infrastructure and is one of the services with highest robustness, 
scalability and storage capacity in comparison to other providers of this service [83]. The 
tools, resources and steps described next were used/followed in the C3-SEC software 
project, to make use of AWS, Amazon Web Services, specifically EC2, Amazon Elastic 
Compute Cloud. 
• Java Development Kit (JDK) [84], provides the necessary tools for the development 
and coding of programs in Java (e.g. Java applications and applets).  
• Amazon Machine Image (AMI) [85], is a template that contains the software 
configuration (operating system, application server and applications) that are 
required to launch an instance of the virtual machine. It can select an AMI provided 
by AWS, the user community, or the AWS market, or make use of customized AMI. 
• PUTTY [86], it's a free Telnet and SSH implementation for Windows and Linux 
platforms, along with an xterm terminal emulator. 
• Secure SHell (SSH) [87], is a protocol that facilitates secure communications 
between two systems using a client / server architecture and allows users to remotely 
connect to a host. Unlike other remote communication protocols such as FTP or 
Telnet, SSH encrypts the connection session, making it difficult for anyone to obtain 
unencrypted passwords. 
• Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides a scalable, high-reliability, low-cost cloud 
infrastructure that drives hundreds of thousands of businesses in 190 countries 
around the world. Thanks to data centers located in the US, Europe, Brazil, 
Singapore, Japan and Australia, customers from all economic sectors can benefit 
[88]. 
• Glassfish Server: It is an open source application server that offers advanced features 
such as application version control, application scope resources, and great support 
for NetBeans 7.0 development tools, and higher versions such as Eclipse and Other 
popular IDEs [89]. 
• JDBC: Java Database Connectivity, sends SQL commands to a relational database 
engine, which can be Oracle, Infomix, SyBase, etc. JDBC is a low-level API for 
high-level APIs, also providing an integration of SQL into Java, i.e. SQL statements 
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mixed with Java (e.g. a Java variable can be used in an SQL statement to receive or 
return results) [90]. 
• EC2: Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud, are the virtual servers in the cloud provided 
by Amazon [91]. 
The steps described next are required to run the application in the cloud: 
1. In http://aws.amazon.com web page (see Figure 26) a “Register” operation must be 
performed with an email account, and a password. 
 
 
Figure 26 Home Amazon Web Services 
 
2. Once the subscription and “Log in” has been done the data about all the Web Services 
Amazon provides is presented (see Figure 27). For the software project of this thesis 
EC2 was selected (Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud). 
 
 
Figure 27 Amazon Web Services 
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3. Selecting the “EC2 Dashboard” option allows for the creation of the required 
instance and “Launch Instance” button (Figure 28) for running it. 
 
 
Figure 28 EC2 Dashboard 
 
4. To create the new instance, it is necessary to set the parameters that comply with the 
tools needed to upload the application to the cloud (Mysql, Glassfish server). In the 
present project Ubuntu Server 16.04 free version was selected (see Figure 29). 
 
 
Figure 29 AMI in AWS 
The AMI has the following characteristics: 
• Operating System: Ubuntu Server 16.04 
• Instance Type: t2.micro 
• Memory: 1GiB = 1.07 GB 
• Processor: Intel Xeon High Frequency, Turbo up to 3.3 GHz 
• Layer: Free 
 
5. In this instance, it is necessary to add in the “Configure Security Group”, the rule 
“Custom TCP Rule” (TCP protocol is necessary to guarantee ordered delivery of data 
packets) and reserve the 4848 port for this service. Being a resource that is widely 
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required in the project “Source” configuration must be set to “Anywhere”. Once the 
instance is configured “Review and Launch” can be performed (see Figure 30). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 30 Configure Security Group 
 
6. For security purposes a public key cryptography “Key Pair” must be generated and 
a corresponding label/description assigned for key management tasks support, 
(“Download Key Pair” button as shown in Figure 31). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31  Creation New Key Pair 
 
7. Once the Key Pair is generated, the instance is launched and an automatic notification 
with a message with the state of the instance is generated (as shown in Figure 32). 
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Figure 32 Instance Launch Status  
The next step is to connect to the instance with the Java SSH client provided by 
Amazon or with the Putty tools [92]. 
 
8. As shown in Figure 33 Putty allows the generation of the private key “.ppk” by 
reading the previously downloaded KeyPair .pem. 
 
 
Figure 33 PuttyGen Tool  
 
9. Using Putty tool with the Public IP address generated for the Amazon instance and 
the corresponding private key (.ppk) is possible to access and manage the cloud 
service via a SSH (secure) connection (Figure  34) . 
 
Figure 34 Putty Panel 
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10. After the SSH connection to the virtual machine is made with root user access (sudo 
-i), various required updates can be done using the following sequence of commands: 
• apt-get update (to update the virtual machine). 
• apt-get install openjdk-7-jdk (for JDK Version 7 Installation). 
• wget download.java.net/glassfish/4.0/release/glassfish-4.0.zip (for Glassfish 
Installation). 
• apt-get install unzip (for Unzip Installation). 
• cp glassfish-4.0.zip /opt (to copy Zip Glassfish to the machine applications 
folder). 
• unzip glassfish-4.0.zip (to Unzip Glassfish). 
• glassfish4/glassfish/bin/asadmin start (to start domain Glassfish).  
• glassfish4/glassfish/bin/asadmin change-admin-password (to set Glassfish 
password). 
• glassfish4/glassfish/bin/asadmin enable-secure-admin (to enable Glassfish Web 
Administrator Login). 
• glassfish4/glassfish/bin/asadmin restart-domain (to restart domain Glassfish). 
• apt-get install MySql-server (for MySql Server installation).  
• MySql –h localhost –u root –proot (to connect to MySql Server). 
• create database BaseName (to create the database). 
• use BaseName (to mount the database). 
• exit (copy databasesScript and exit MySql). 
• wgethttp://cdn.MySql.com/Downloads/Connector-J/MySql-connector-java-
5.1.36.zip (download MySql Connector – Java). 
• glassfish4/glassfish/bin/asadmin start (restart Glassfish). 
• unzip MySql-connector-java-5.1.36.zip (Unzip Conector MySql – Java). 
• glassfish4/glassfish/bin/asadmin asadmin restart-domain (restart domain 
Glassfish). 
Once the machine has been configured correctly, access http://34.209.91.214:4848/ for 
managing Glassfish via a web administrator interface. As a final step, we enter the 
“Applications” module in the “deploy” option and load the application's .war file so that it 
is deployed to the glassfish server. In Figure 35 we can see that the application has been 
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deployed correctly and we can access it using the following link: 
http://34.209.91.214:8080/DecisionMakerTool-1.0.0-SNAPSHOT. 
 
 
Figure 35 Glassfish Console  
 
5.7 Editing Ontology in Protégé 
The ontology created by C3-SEC (described in previous sections) is a key component of the 
decision aiding software proposed in this thesis, which can be edited and extended with 
specialized, corporations custom knowledge provided by the cyber security expert using the 
Protégé ontology editor. The ontology is initially created by C3-SEC and placed in the 
application directory in the resources folder as “OntologyNexpose.owl”. This file can be 
edited and updated by the CISO with the Protégé editor, for instance to add new attributes 
or environment variables to allow the calculation of the risk of the organization assets. 
Protégé editor version 5.00 was used in this thesis to edit the OWL ontology (Figure 36). In 
chapter 6 (Case Study) an example of the advantages of (ontology level) knowledge provided 
by the cyber security expert using Protégé is presented. 
 
 
Figure 36 View of the Ontology in Protégé  
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Figures 37 to 41 show the user-friendly interface of Protégé to add new individuals, data and 
object properties, and axioms/rules, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 37 Adding individuals in Protégé  
 
 
Figure 38 Adding Object Properties in Protégé  
 
 
Figure 39 Adding Data Properties in Protégé  
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Figure 40 Adding New Object Property in Protégé  
 
 
Figure 41 Characteristics Object Property in Protégé 
Delete selected 
properties 
Add sub 
property 
Add sibling 
property  
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Case Study 
 
The case study presented in this thesis was carried out at the “Research Center of the 
Department of Computer Science of Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas ESPE” in Ecuador. 
Nexpose was used to carry out a scan in the research center ICT infrastructure that allowed 
to analyze possible threats and to perform cyber security risk assessment, followed by a C3-
SEC analysis.  
6.1 Case Study Nexpose Cyber Security Risk Analysis 
As described in previous sections, Nexpose offers the possibility to calculate risk using 
different strategies adjusted to the organization's environment, helping to prioritize the 
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed first. The study is focused on the comparison of 
different risk assessment strategies applied within the same case study. Table 15 shows the 
risk calculated by Nexpose, with a total of 49 vulnerabilities found, not considering the 
criticality factor (CVSS environmental metrics).       
 
Strategy Risk Score Original 
RealRisk 17,920 
TemporalPlus 48,048 
Temporal 43,227 
Weighted 10.0 
PCI ASV 2.0 Risk 5.0 
Table 15 Nexpose Risk Scores 
 
The criticality factor shows the importance of an asset or its impact on business. In Nexpose 
this is identified by the “Criticality Tag”. Each criticality tag has an associated risk score 
modifier. The listed risk modifiers will be included in asset risk score calculations when 
“Risk Score Adjustment” is enabled. These values can be adjusted according to the specific 
needs of the business. Figure 42 shows Nexpose default values form adopted for the case 
study. 
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Figure 42 Risk Score Adjustment 
 
In Nexpose, the risk score is applied to a site (asset or collection of assets that are targeted 
for a scan) or asset group. The calculation used to determine the risk for the entire site or 
group depends on the risk strategy. In addition, the criticality gets applied to each asset and 
the total risk score for the group is calculated based upon the individual asset risk scores. 
“To calculate the risk score for an individual asset, Nexpose uses the algorithm 
corresponding to the selected risk strategy. If ‘Risk Score Adjustment’ is set and the asset 
has a criticality tag applied, the application then multiplies the risk score determined by the 
risk strategy by the modifier specified for that criticality tag” [93]. The values presented in 
Table 16 were applied to a site with an asset (server), in each column can be observed the 
difference between the risk scores with respect to the applied criticality tag (see Figure 42) 
and the selected strategy. In case of having more than one asset to be compared, the asset 
with the highest risk score will have higher priority. 
 
 Criticality 
Strategy Very High High Normal Low Very Low 
RealRisk 35,841 26,881 17,920 13,440 8,960 
TemporalPlus 96,096 72,072 48,048 36,036 24,024 
Temporal 86,454 64,840 43,227 32,420 21,613 
Weighted 20.1 15.0 10.0 7.5 5.0 
PCI ASV 2.0 Risk 10.0 7.5 5.0 3.8 2.5 
Table 16 Risk Score Comparison 
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Complementarily, Figure 43 shows the report generated by Nexpose about the vulnerabilities 
found. This report allows the identification of vulnerabilities that may affect the organization 
most critically based on some most relevant criteria such as CVSS score, according to risk 
strategy and severity. 
 
In addition, Nexpose offers different graphical reports to gain insights into what is happening 
in the organization environment as well as to understand how the vulnerabilities are affecting 
and jeopardizing the company's assets. One of the useful reports for an organization's cyber 
security team is the “Vulnerabilities by CVSS score”, which shows the amount of 
vulnerabilities group by CVSS score ranges. Figure 44 shows a Nexpose graphical report 
from the case study. 
6.2 Case Study C3-SEC Cyber Security Risk Analysis  
In this section, the C3-SEC features which extend Nexpose risk analysis possibilities are 
highlighted. For this case study, the scanning of two assets of the institution were taken so 
that two XML files of the Nexpose tool were generated and load into C3-SEC through the 
integration mechanisms developed for C3-SEC (presented in previous sections of the thesis). 
Figure 43 Report Vulnerabilities Found 
Figure 44 Vulnerabilities by CVSS Score 
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The first file was loaded with the option “Create new ontology” as shown in Figure 45 
because this was the first time the information about the IT infrastructure of the institution 
was loaded into C3-SEC. 
 
 
Figure 45 Form Upload C3-SEC 
 
In the “Dashboard” module shown in Figure 46, we can see the cyber security risk analysis 
generated by C3-SEC. The graphics that can be observed in Figure 46 show clearly the 
vulnerabilities by category as well as the number of vulnerabilities that affect each pillar, 
being these reports a specific characteristic (cyber security risk analysis extension) of C3-
SEC. 
 
 
Figure 46 C3-SEC Report (One asset) 
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To load the second file, the option “Add new asset to ontology created” of the Upload 
Module was chosen. This allows adding a new institution asset to the ontology already 
created. The results presented by C3-SEC relate the information of each of the assets through 
a query made to the ontology to generate the report that shows the vulnerabilities that affect 
the company in the different security pillars. Figure  47 shows a view of the case study. 
 
 
Figure 47 C3-SEC Result Report 
 
For cyber security risk analysis with C3-SEC, the institution security expert added ontology 
level knowledge related to the location of the assets using the Protégé ontology editor. C3-
SEC is able to use the knowledge (assertions and rules) provided by the expert to reason (by 
the means of description logics inference) about assets, cyber security properties and 
corresponding cyber security risk computation. In this case study, the expert added the 
following knowledge to the ontology: 
• Creation of a location individual under the ontology class “Location”, which 
represents the location in which the asset is located. 
• Insertion of the object property “isLocationOf” that allows to relate the location 
to the asset. 
• Insertion of the data property “isOfEasyPhysicalAccess” which establishes the 
facility with which an asset can be accessed in a certain location. 
• Once the knowledge has been added to the ontology by the expert, the RDF / 
XML file must be saved and named “OntologyNexpose.owl” so that it can be 
read by C3-SEC. 
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The knowledge inserted by the expert in the ontology in this example allows C3-SEC 
reasoning in situations such as: an asset located in a location that was assigned easy physical 
access is also of easy physical access and therefore is subject of security risks, namely with 
reflexes on the availability pillar. In the current case study, the location of the Research 
Center was added with the name “C.Investigacion”, being the place where the server of the 
case study is located. To relate the asset to the location, the object property “isLocationOf” 
was added and linked to the individual of the “Device” class representing the asset. Protégé 
autocompletion features creates an user friendly user interface which automatically loads the 
names of individuals from the ontology, then it is only necessary for the user to enter the 
first few letters of the asset name or search from the list of individuals.  
 
Finally, to specify the ease of access of the location the user must enter the value “yes” in 
case the location is easily accessible or “no”, otherwise, in the data property 
“isOfEasyPhysicalAccess”. In the case study, “yes” was selected stating that this location is 
of easy physical access, having security reflexes on all assets located at “C.Investigacion” 
and in the subsequent C3-SEC cyber security risk analysis. Figure 48 shows the (SWRL) 
rule stating that (individuals) ICT equipment located in a (physically) easily accessible 
location are also of easy physical access and have therefore its security properties (e.g. 
availability pillar) affected. This rule is an example of the reasoning support the OWL 
ontology provides to C3-SEC. Figure 49 shows the knowledge added to the ontology, 
involving the practical application of this rule in the case study adopted in the thesis. 
 
 
Figure 48 Rule of Location-Related to Ontology Properties Characteristics 
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Figure 49 Adding Properties about Location in Protégé 
When the dashboard module is updated, as shown in the Figure 50, we can see that the 
number of vulnerabilities affected has changed when compared to the previous result (see 
Figure 47). This is due to the inference made by the Pellet reasoner in the ontology, followed 
by a query in C3-SEC to obtain the vulnerabilities that affect the institution. The transitive 
characteristic of the “isOfEasyAccess” property turns all assets located in an easy access 
location of easy access, affecting its security properties (e.g. availability) and corresponding 
C3-SEC cyber security risk analysis reports. The query to obtain the new “Availability” 
security pillar indicator, used to generate the results shown in Figure 50, is as follows: 
 
This query allows to find all the vulnerabilities that affect an asset in a certain location and 
that are also easily accessible, which directly affects the Availability. The rules added to the 
ontology allow to relate each individual of the classes “Device”, “Vulnerability” and 
"Location" through the inverse object properties to each other such as “affectTo” and 
“hasVulnerability” for the classes “Device” and “Vulnerability” and the 
“isOfEasyPhysicalAccess” datatype property for the Device and Location classes. The result 
will be that all the vulnerabilities complying with this condition are added to the previous 
calculation (Nexpose calculation without inference support), taking into account eventual 
redundant vulnerabilities found with respect to the security pillar “Availability”. 
 
Vulnerability that affectTo some (isOfEasyPhysicalAccess value 
“yes”) or affectTo value Availability. 
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Figure 50 Report Affected Security Pillars 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page was intentionally left blank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 81 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis was motivated by the fast growth of cyber security threats and incidents widely 
documented by scientific, technical, business and governmental entities and authorities. 
The thesis contribution is targeted to corporation level cyber security risk management and 
follows a context-aware systems approach to provide corporations cyber security situation 
awareness. C3-SEC addresses a cyber security scope and features that are missing in state 
of the art existing tools for this domain. It is based on a contextual knowledge representation 
approach that allows to identify, define, develop and apply a simple, comprehensive security 
analysis and assurance of business continuity.  
 
The context-aware systems reference model (perception, comprehension, projection and 
decision/action layers) lead the analysis, design, development and implementation of C3-
SEC project. For the first level (perception), a comparative analysis was carried out between 
the main cyber security tools for scanning a company's technological infrastructure assets 
and vulnerabilities: Nessus Home, Saint8, Nmap (ZenMap), eEye Retina, GFI LANguard, 
nCircle® IP360, Security System, Analyzer 2.0 Beta, OpenVas, Nexpose, QualysGuard. A 
comparison framework and metrics (operating system, support for cyber security data 
exchange standards, etc.) was defined an applied, resulting in the selection of Nexpose as 
the best option to be integrated as a component of C3-SEC context-aware systems model. 
At the comprehension level, an OWL ontology was designed taking into account the data 
and semantic models of Nexpose. Complementary knowledge (e.g. description logics rules) 
was added to the ontology for C3-SEC decision making support (e.g. RDF/OWL queries). 
None of the state-of-the-art tools studied addressed the comprehension layer by the means 
of (OWL) semantic knowledge representation and knowledge management. C3-SEC is 
proposed in the current thesis to fill this gap and to take advantage of all the benefits made 
available by semantic web standards and technologies. 
 
For the projection level, a comparative analysis was performed between the scanning tools 
in relation to the risk analysis features. Based on this comparison, missing features were 
identified and the lack of assets physical location consideration for cyber security risk 
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analysis purposes was selected as the feature to introduce and highlight in C3-SEC. The 
influence of assets physical location in the security pillar “Availability” was illustrated in the 
case study adopted in the thesis to validate C3-SEC approach and software. 
As future work, it is intended to incorporate new risk management strategies in C3-SEC and 
simplify (make more transparent) Nexpose and C3-SEC integration, adding presentation 
layer integration mechanisms, single sign on features, unified configuration files and 
graphical interfaces, etc. 
 
C3-SEC revealed in the thesis case study to provide valuable help for cyber security 
decision-makers to make informed decisions, by combining international authorities cyber 
security technical data about vulnerabilities and corporations experts specific knowledge, 
and suggesting the best course of action to mitigate vulnerabilities and ensure business 
continuity in today's hostile cyber environment. 
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Appendix 1 – Base Ontology 
 
Following the OWL file made as the base ontology for the C3-SEC application. 
 
 <?xml version="1.0"?> 
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#" 
     xml:base="http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl" 
     xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
     xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
     xmlns:xml="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace" 
     xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
     xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#"> 
    <owl:Ontology rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl"/> 
     
    <!--  
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
///////////// 
    // 
    // Object Properties 
    // 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////// 
     --> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#affectTo --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#affectTo"> 
        <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasVulnerability"/> 
        <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isAttackBy"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#SecurityPillars"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasDescription --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasDescription"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Description"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasExploit --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasExploit"> 
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        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Exploit"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasMalware --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasMalware"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Malware"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasReference --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasReference"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Reference"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasSolution --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasSolution"> 
        <rdfs:subPropertyOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#topObjectProperty"/> 
        <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#solvedA"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Solution"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasTag --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasTag"> 
        <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#identifyTo"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Tag"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasVulnerability --
> 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#hasVulnerability"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Device"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#VulnerabilityDefinitions"/> 
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    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#identifyTo --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#identifyTo"/> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isAttackBy --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isAttackBy"/> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isLocatedIn --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isLocatedIn"> 
        <owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isLocationOf"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isLocationOf --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isLocationOf"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Location"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Device"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#runsOnSw --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#runsOnSw"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Device"/> 
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Software"/> 
    </owl:ObjectProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#solvedA --> 
 
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#solvedA"/> 
     
    <!--  
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
///////////// 
    // 
    // Data properties 
    // 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////// 
     --> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#added --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#added"> 
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        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#address --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#address"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Device"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#cvssScore --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#cvssScore"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#cvssVector --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#cvssVector"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#family --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#family"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#OperativeSystem"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#id --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#id"> 
        <rdfs:subPropertyOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#topDataProperty"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#idDevice --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#idDevice"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Device"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#idExploit --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#idExploit"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Exploit"/> 
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    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isOfEasyPhysicalAccess --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#isOfEasyPhysicalAccess"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Location"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#link --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#link"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Exploit"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#modified --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#modified"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#nameDevice --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#nameDevice"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Device"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#nameReference --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#nameReference"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Reference"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#nameTag --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#nameTag"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Tag"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#paragraph --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#paragraph"> 
        <rdfs:subPropertyOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#topDataProperty"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Solution"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#pciSeverety --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#pciSeverety"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
        <rdfs:range> 
            <rdfs:Datatype> 
                <owl:onDatatype 
rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
                <owl:withRestrictions rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
                    <rdf:Description> 
                        <xsd:minInclusive 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">1</xsd:minInclusi
ve> 
                    </rdf:Description> 
                    <rdf:Description> 
                        <xsd:maxInclusive 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">5</xsd:maxInclusi
ve> 
                    </rdf:Description> 
                </owl:withRestrictions> 
            </rdfs:Datatype> 
        </rdfs:range> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#product --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#product"> 
        <rdfs:subPropertyOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#topDataProperty"/> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#OperativeSystem"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#published --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#published"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#riskScore --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#riskScore"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#riskScoreDevice --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#riskScoreDevice"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Device"/> 
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    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#severity --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#severity"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
        <rdfs:range> 
            <rdfs:Datatype> 
                <owl:onDatatype 
rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"/> 
                <owl:withRestrictions rdf:parseType="Collection"> 
                    <rdf:Description> 
                        <xsd:minInclusive 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">1</xsd:minInclusi
ve> 
                    </rdf:Description> 
                    <rdf:Description> 
                        <xsd:maxInclusive 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">10</xsd:maxInclus
ive> 
                    </rdf:Description> 
                </owl:withRestrictions> 
            </rdfs:Datatype> 
        </rdfs:range> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#skillLevel --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#skillLevel"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Exploit"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#title --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#title"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#titleExploit --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#titleExploit"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Exploit"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#type --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#type"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Exploit"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
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    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#valueDescription --
> 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#valueDescription"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Description"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#valueMalware --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#valueMalware"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Malware"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#valueReference --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#valueReference"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Reference"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#vendor --> 
 
    <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#vendor"> 
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#OperativeSystem"/> 
    </owl:DatatypeProperty> 
 
    <!--  
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////// 
    // 
    // Classes 
    // 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////// 
     --> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Description --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Description"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Device --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Device"/> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Exploit --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Exploit"> 
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        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Location --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Location"/> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Malware --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Malware"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#OperativeSystem --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#OperativeSystem"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Software"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Reference --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Reference"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#SecurityPillars --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#SecurityPillars"/> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Software --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Software"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#Thing"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Solution --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Solution"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Tag --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Tag"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"/> 
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    </owl:Class> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Vulnerability"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#VulnerabilityDefinitions"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#VulnerabilityDefinitions --> 
 
    <owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#VulnerabilityDefinitions"> 
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#Thing"/> 
    </owl:Class> 
     
    <!--  
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////// 
    // 
    // Individuals 
    // 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////// 
     --> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Authenticity --> 
 
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Authenticity"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#SecurityPillars"/> 
    </owl:NamedIndividual> 
     
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Availability --> 
 
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Availability"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#SecurityPillars"/> 
    </owl:NamedIndividual> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Confidentiality --> 
 
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Confidentiality"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#SecurityPillars"/> 
    </owl:NamedIndividual> 
 
    <!-- http://www.co-ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Integrity --> 
 
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#Integrity"> 
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.co-
ode.org/ontologies/testont.owl#SecurityPillars"/> 
    </owl:NamedIndividual> 
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</rdf:RDF> 
 
<!-- Generated by the OWL API (version 4.2.1.20160306-0033) 
https://github.com/owlcs/owlapi --> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
